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*The Department of State*

# bulletin

Vol. XXVI, No. 664

March 17, 1952

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FOR PEACE •**

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## The Mutual Security Program: A Program for Peace

### MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

I recommend that the Congress authorize the continuance of the Mutual Security Program for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953. Such action is essential to advance our program for world peace and to protect the security of the United States.

The Mutual Security Program provides equipment, supplies, and technical cooperation to enable friendly countries to carry out military and economic programs that will bring very great returns in increasing their security and our own. In such case, the countries concerned are driving to accomplish objectives which will bring closer to full realization our mutual goals of freedom and peace under the great principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Without some resources from us to add to their own, these objectives cannot be accomplished.

My support for this program rests on four propositions:

First, the plain fact is that we cannot achieve lasting security for ourselves except in association with other nations.

Second, the funds provided by the United States under the Mutual Security Program are essential to the success of the common efforts we are making with other free nations for peace.

Third, the funds thus invested by the United States will yield far larger returns, in terms of our own security, than if the same amount were used for our own defense establishment.

Fourth, the cost of the Mutual Security Program, together with the much larger costs of our military services and other defense measures, are well within our economic capacity.

#### Introduction

I do not need to review here the tragic circumstances which have compelled this Nation to undertake massive programs for national defense and for mutual security. Most of us fully understand

today the grimness of the threat which Soviet aggression carries for the survival of civilization.

Neither do I need to dwell upon the fact that all our military preparations are defensive preparations. We are seeking to create strength in the world sufficient to prevent aggression. We do not contemplate expenditures in the magnitude or of the character necessary to launch aggression. These facts underline the statement which cannot be too often repeated: Our objective is peace, not war.

The point I do want to emphasize, for there still appear to be some people who do not recognize it, is that to achieve peace we must work together with other nations.

Some people would have us withdraw to our own shores and gamble our national safety on air and naval power. A glance at some of the vital materials that go into air and naval power illustrates how self-defeating this would be. Four-fifths or more of the manganese, the tin, and the chrome in a United States destroyer or jet fighter comes from outside the western hemisphere. Should we turn our back on the rest of the world, these and other precious resources, so vital to our own security, would not only be lost to us, but in all probability would be added to the military strength of the Soviet empire.

Without our friends abroad, the threat of aggression would move close to our own shores. Without their armed forces, the bases on their soil, and the raw materials from their mines and forests, our military power would be gravely hampered in its defense of the United States, and our whole economy would be seriously weakened. Our support and assistance for other nations, therefore, are not in the nature of charity. These are not hand-outs which we can carelessly offer or withdraw without regard to the effect on our own safety. The problems of American survival would be multiplied to an incalculable extent if we had to face the Soviet threat without the support and assistance of other nations.

The Mutual Security Program is justified not only by these hard strategic and military realities. It is, in addition, the only course which fulfills our position as a world leader in the battle for freedom and the rights of man. That is the reason so many nations freely join with us in a common faith in democracy and a common desire for peace. These nations are our friends, and not our satellites. As friends, they contribute to the

<sup>1</sup> H. doc. 382; transmitted Mar. 6. Also printed as Department of State publication 4531. For text of the radio and television address on the Mutual Security Program which the President delivered on Mar. 6, see White House press release of the date.



shared wisdom and faith of the free world—a wisdom and faith on which no single nation can claim a monopoly. We must accordingly take care to treat them as friends. We must not act as though we wished to degrade them to the rank of satellites by exacting a rigid and humiliating subservience which no free nation could with dignity accept. We will never be defeated as long as we truly stand for a free partnership of free peoples. The unconquerable power of the free world lies in the fact that loyalties are not concerned.

The concrete requirements of American security compel us to a policy of international cooperation. But it would be, I believe, a misrepresentation of the American people to suppose that self-interest—even wise and enlightened self-interest—is the only cause for our concern with the outside world. As a nation, we have been dedicated through our history to the belief that responsible men deserve a democratic government and a free society. This belief is the essence of our way of life. We would betray our intermost convictions if today we were to flee the cause of the free peoples. If through inaction we desert the cause of democracy, the democratic hope may be exterminated in broad areas of this earth. If we rise to our historic traditions, we can add powerful momentum to the democratic counter-offensive which inspires in the people of the world a sense of their own destiny as free men—and which will in the end burst the bonds of tyranny everywhere on earth.

The pursuit of mutual security through mutual strength is thus the keystone of the broad foreign policy which the United States and other free nations have adopted as the surest road to lasting peace.

The American people have steadfastly supported this foreign policy since the Second World War. Its pattern today is sharp and clear. If I were to make a brief definition of our policy, I would call it the policy of peace through collective strength. We are joined with other countries in the patient and systematic building in the free world of enough military strength to deter external Communist aggression, and of economic and political and moral strength to remove internal threats of Communist subversion and point the way toward democratic progress.

I wish to emphasize very strongly that all these forms of strength are necessary if we are to achieve freedom and peace. The plain and inescapable fact is that they are indivisible. Neither military strength nor economic strength nor political strength nor moral strength can do the job alone.

Military strength is the first necessity, for without a shield against aggression the free world would be helpless before the enemy. Military strength must be built, and we must help build it, in Europe and in other critical areas of the

world. But military strength is not just a matter of delivering arms to our allies. It is also a matter of defense support to enable our allies to do more to expand and equip their own defense forces.

And even arms and defense support together do not provide a full answer to the Soviet threat; to believe that they do is dangerously to misunderstand the nature of the foe. The gun is but one weapon in the Soviet arsenal of aggression. If we ignored the necessity for building moral and political and economic strength, we would expose ourselves to the danger of Communist gains which could be at least as damaging as outright aggression. Since the Soviet Union does not rely exclusively on military attack, we would be foolish indeed to rely exclusively on military defense.

#### Outline of the Program

The funds required under the Mutual Security Program fall into two broad categories.

The first of these, which is by far the larger, is for assistance in building up the military strength of friendly nations. This aid is of two types: (1) direct military aid, primarily in the form of military equipment and components thereof, and (2) defense support—primarily in the form of raw materials, commodities, and machinery—to enable other countries to sustain and increase their military efforts where that type of support produces greater returns in military strength than would an equal amount of direct military aid. The bulk of the direct military aid and of the defense support will go to strengthen the defenses of the free nations in Europe. Amounts for direct military aid and defense support make up about 90 percent of the total funds recommended for the Mutual Security Program for the fiscal year 1953.

The second broad category is for economic and technical assistance, primarily for the underdeveloped areas of the world, where economic progress is the first essential in the battle for freedom. Some of these funds will in fact also support defense efforts in certain countries in Southeast Asia, where Communist aggression is an immediate menace. Amounts recommended for economic and technical assistance are about 10 percent of the total.

The distribution of the amounts recommended is shown in more detail in the following table:

In the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the Congress provided for an integrated program, administered by appropriate operating agencies under the general direction of the Director for Mutual Security. These arrangements are working well, and I recommend that they be continued. Under them, direct military aid will be administered by the Department of Defense. The Mutual Security Agency will administer defense support in Europe, together with technical and economic



assistance in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. In South Asia, the Near East, Latin America, and the independent states of Africa, economic and technical assistance will be administered by the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State.

We shall continue our policy of closely coordinating the Mutual Security Program with the technical assistance programs of the Organization of American States and the United Nations and its agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization. In addition, we shall continue to encourage, to the maximum extent possible, the investment of private capital for economic development abroad, and we shall continue to relate outlays under the Mutual Security Program to the loans being made by the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

#### EUROPE

Today, the problem of achieving security and strength in free Europe, in my judgment, is on the way to solution. The last 5 years have recorded remarkable gains as a result of actions we have taken under our policy of peace through collective strength—first in Greece and Turkey; then, in 1948, through the European Recovery Program, and since 1949 through the growing defensive power of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The American contribution did not of itself create these gains; but it did supply the essential margin without which the Europeans could not have fought their way out of their post-war slough of despond.

Five years ago, many European nations were on the verge of economic or political collapse. A divided and despairing continent—next to our own, the most productive and industrially powerful in the world—lay open for Soviet conquest.

How different the picture is today. Europe has made immense advances—in economic output, in military strength, in political self-confidence, in

progress toward unity. Today, the Soviet Union knows that it cannot achieve its purposes in Europe, so long as the policy of collective strength continues.

Europe still has far to go. Economic health and vitality in Europe require a series of specific actions—varying from country to country—to raise industrial and agricultural productivity, to knock down trade barriers and exchange restrictions, and to encourage the vigorous forces of competition in European and world markets. They require further progress toward the democratic goals of a fair distribution of income, strong and free trade unions, fair and effective tax systems, and programs of land reform.

Above all, we in the United States do not believe that Western Europe can achieve its full strength without accelerated progress toward unity. Only this unity can release the great potential energy of free Europe. We will continue in every way we can to encourage its attainment.

The difficulties are very great. It is only candid to report that progress in this direction has not always been as fast as we hoped. Yet, in many respects the progress has been most impressive.

A revolution has been taking place in European thinking. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union have laid foundations for joint action in the economic and financial fields. In the Schuman Plan, six countries are creating an international authority for the production and distribution of coal and steel. Under the European Defense Community, the same six countries are planning to establish common armed forces, a common defense ministry, and a common military budget.

Europe has moved faster toward integration in the last 5 years than it did in the previous 500. At every stage in this movement, the United States has provided encouragement and support. If this progress continues in the next 5 years—and I am confident it will—a new Europe will emerge

*Mutual Security Program, 1953*

(In millions)

	Direct military	Defense support	Economic and technical	Administration	Area totals
Europe . . . . .	4, 070	<sup>1</sup> 1, 819	.....	.....	5, 889
Near East and Africa . . . . .	606	.....	196	.....	802
Asia and the Pacific . . . . .	611	.....	<sup>2</sup> 408	.....	1, 019
American Republics . . . . .	62	.....	22	.....	84
Multilateral Technical Assistance, Migration, and Relief . . . . .	.....	.....	30	.....	30
Package Freight Administration . . . . .	.....	.....	.....	75	75
Total . . . . .	<sup>3</sup> 5, 350	1, 819	656	75	<sup>3</sup> 7, 900

<sup>1</sup> Includes economic assistance for Austria.

<sup>2</sup> Includes assistance to support military efforts in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

<sup>3</sup> Columns do not add to totals because of rounding.

as a great and creative partner in the defense of freedom.

It is this progress toward European economic recovery and political unity which makes possible a growing defense effort in Western Europe. The build-up of military strength there since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty has been most encouraging. In the coming fiscal year, European military expenditures will be considerably more than twice as large as they were in the year preceding the Communist aggression in Korea. Production of military matériel in Western Europe has multiplied about four times in that period. The European nations have lengthened the training periods under their compulsory military service programs and have substantially enlarged and improved their armed forces. The pace of the military build-ups has given many millions of Europeans new confidence in their capacity to resist aggression.

This is an impressive record of progress. Of course, the record is far from perfect—especially in view of the urgency of the threat posed by aggressive Soviet imperialism. We can find many specific weaknesses and shortcomings to criticize—and some people in our country fasten their attention so exclusively on such things as to advocate that the defense of Europe be abandoned. I do not wish to minimize the shortcomings, but the fundamental question to ask is: “Are we moving at a substantial rate in the right direction? Is real progress being made?” The answer is obvious. So is the conclusion to be drawn. The record abundantly warrants confidence in our European allies, and our continued steadfast support for them.

Two weeks ago, at Lisbon, the member nations took the most far reaching strides in European defense since the adoption of the North Atlantic Treaty itself in 1949. The North Atlantic Council at Lisbon endorsed the specific means through which the forces of the European Defense Community—including German contingents—will be organized and tied into General Eisenhower’s command. After months of planning by the special committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Harriman, the Council made specific and concrete decisions providing for the more rapid build-up of forces and for the provision of the necessary equipment and construction to support them.

By the end of this calendar year, General Eisenhower’s command is expected to have at its disposal a formidable force—including some 50 army divisions, about half of them on active duty, and some 4,000 military planes—and a sound base for further build-up in 1953 and 1954. These forces, joined by those of Greece and Turkey, will bring within measurable distance the time when even the most foolhardy man in the Kremlin will not dare risk open attack.

In order to equip the forces being raised by our allies under the Lisbon agreements, we as well as

they must step up our efforts. There have been delays in our own production and delivery of arms. And combat requirements for Korea have, of course, received top priority for deliveries from our current output. I am assured that production is now being accelerated substantially, and I have consequently directed that deliveries to the North Atlantic Treaty defense forces be greatly speeded up.

The rearmament effort has also created problems in Europe. The European economy, after its extraordinary comeback in the years of the European Recovery Program, has now been subjected to new and severe pressures. The Marshall Plan was designed to help restore minimum economic health, not to produce a surplus capable of creating military forces adequate for European defense. Today, not only has rearmament imposed a heavy direct burden, but the global consequences of rearmament—including rises in the prices both of raw materials generally and of finished goods from the United States—have drastically upset the European balance of payments. Substantial and sustained efforts will be necessary to meet these problems, even with our help.

However, the European countries have a sizable capacity to increase their armed forces, to construct military bases and facilities, and to produce military equipment and supplies—if we provide the crucial margin of raw materials and other support for their defense efforts. If we provide this margin of resources, the European countries will be able to produce far more military equipment than they otherwise could, and to maintain far larger armed forces than would otherwise be possible. Our defense support will allow them to use plants, machinery, materials, and manpower which exist in Europe, but which otherwise could not be devoted to defense purposes. For this reason, our defense support is an extremely economical way to achieve military strength for our mutual security. The funds included in the Mutual Security Program for defense support will yield, according to the best estimates, more than twice as much military strength in Europe as would the same funds spent for the direct transfer of military equipment from the United States.

Accordingly, the Mutual Security Program for Europe is planned so that the United States will provide both weapons and defense support. The form of assistance—whether military equipment or assistance in financing imports of raw materials and other items where required to make possible the necessary level of European defense efforts—has been decided in each case on the basis of which form produces the most results in defensive strength at the least cost.

In addition to the funds for the North Atlantic Treaty countries and Western Germany, limited amounts are included in the Mutual Security Pro-

gram for Yugoslavia, whose defiance of the Soviet Union is giving heart to untold millions behind the Iron Curtain; for Austria, where continued economic assistance is necessary to maintain economic stability in the face of occupation of part of the country by Soviet forces; and for facilitating emigration from Europe under international arrangements. We expect soon to complete arrangements with Spain which will assist in the defense of the Mediterranean area; our part in these arrangements will be carried forward with funds already made available by the Congress.

#### ASIA, AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA

Outside of Europe, our policy of building collective strength for peace must meet and overcome a very different range of problems. The most serious problems of Asia, Africa, and Latin America occur in the underdeveloped areas—the areas which have not yet shared in the benefits of the bursts of scientific and technical advance of the last two centuries.

The people of many of these areas confront the legacy of centuries of neglect—they are in many cases desperately poor, defenseless before famine and disease, disabled by illiteracy. At the same time, they have a new and burning determination to improve their living standards, to fulfill their desire for self-government, to control their own futures. As old social structures have failed to meet the basic needs of their peoples, the popular energy, so long pent up, is bursting forth in fierce nationalism and in fierce demands for real economic change.

These conditions would exist even if there were no Soviet threat to world peace. But the pressure of Soviet communism, working overtime to exploit the turbulence of the underdeveloped areas, greatly increases the necessity for speed in meeting these conditions—speed in the interest, not alone of orderly and democratic development, but of the security of the whole free world.

As a nation born in a struggle for individual freedom, we cordially welcome the aspirations of people to free themselves from oppression and misery. To place ourselves wholeheartedly at their side, we must work with them in their struggle against poverty and famine and illiteracy and disease. In the Point Four concept, we have a means of joining hands with the constructive forces of these areas before bitterness and frustration drive them into a fatal alliance with Soviet communism.

Point Four means making our scientific advances and technical know-how available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. Point Four means technical missionaries at work, and it also means the supplies and equipment that are needed to put new techniques into effect.

No one should think that Point Four involves

some single formula or program which is to be applied everywhere, in equal measure, throughout the underdeveloped regions of the world. The kinds of aid we plan must be tailored both to what we can afford at any given time and to the specific situation in each country. Our experience in Latin America has demonstrated that Point Four operations, to be successful, must be supported by adequate supplies and equipment. The supplies and equipment can be financed in various ways.

Some countries can attract private investment capital and loans to finance most of their outlays for economic development. Other countries can earn enough dollars from their own exports to finance most of the equipment and supplies they need. In still other countries, where neither loans nor private capital can meet the need, this Government must provide substantial quantities of supplies and equipment to assure real progress on vital programs for development. That is the direction we are taking in India today, and in other places where the need is particularly urgent and where the local plans are firm enough to produce a sound result.

Today, we have technical and economic missions in 40 countries. The shirtsleeve diplomats of Point Four are carrying the American revolution to the villages and farms of the world. They are providing farmers with better seed and better fertilizer, better methods of plowing and sowing, and better means of harvesting and saving the crops. They are helping to fight malaria and dysentery, trachoma, and rinderpest. They are providing training in the techniques of modern government. They are helping to build roads and canals and dams, schools, and hospitals. They are teaching people to read, to revitalize the soil, to irrigate it, to drain it. In short, they are teaching people by methods of peace to change their own world without bloodshed.

The funds we invest in Point Four will yield direct and immediate results in terms of larger food production, better communications, more agricultural and health specialists, engineers, and other technicians. But even more important are the longer term results. For the magic of this work is its multiplying effect: If we can help train 10 teachers, they can train hundreds of children; if we can help set up 10 demonstration farms, hundreds of farmers can come and learn to use new methods; if we can help drill a hundred new wells or build a new irrigation dam, thousands of farmers can increase their yields and plow back their earnings into further improvements. In this way, a relatively small investment can bring immense results.

In one district in India, the production of food has already been increased 46 percent. Repeat this across the continents of Asia and Africa and Latin America, and we enter a new era in the history of man.



## *The Near East and Africa*

The Near East presents a sharp challenge to American statesmanship. The countries of these areas are of vital importance to the security of the free world, but the problems of achieving constructive and orderly development are extremely difficult.

Living standards are generally very low. Transportation and land tenure systems are often archaic. Political and religious controversies simmer throughout the region. Nationalism is sometimes misdirected into fanatical outbursts which ignore the benefits to be gained from international cooperation. The Communists are doing their best to stir up confusion and trouble.

Most of these problems can only be solved by the people of these countries finding ways to make solid progress in developing economic strength and effective free institutions. But we can and must help them.

We can help dig wells for irrigation and clean water in Iran and Iraq. We can help set up farm credit institutions and agricultural extension services in Lebanon and Liberia. We can help build roads and establish public health services in Israel. We can help build up school and hospital services in countries throughout the area. For projects of this type, I recommend economic and technical assistance in this area (including help for the Arab refugees) of 196 million dollars.

Military assistance for nations in this area is recommended in the amount of 606 million dollars. Most of these funds are for Greece and Turkey, whose military assistance programs are carried under the heading of the Near East; defense support funds for those countries are included with those for Europe.

To help in maintaining security in the Near East, the United States has joined with Turkey, France, Great Britain, and three Commonwealth countries in proposing the establishment of a Middle East Command. We hope this Command will become the center of cooperative efforts by all countries concerned for the defense of the region as a whole from outside aggression.

## *Asia and the Pacific*

Much of Asia at this moment is under Communist attack. The free nations are holding the line against aggression in Korea and Indochina, and are battling Communist-inspired disorders in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines. The loss of any of these countries would mean the loss of freedom for millions of people, the loss of vital raw materials, the loss of points of critical strategic importance to the free world.

The Mutual Security Program for this area includes military assistance in the amount of 611 million dollars, and economic and technical assistance of 408 million dollars, some of which will

contribute directly to the defense programs of certain countries of Southeast Asia.

Of our military assistance, a large part will go to Indochina where the troops of the French Union and of the Associated States are battling valiantly against the Communist-led forces, and another large part will go to continue to help prepare the Chinese armies on Formosa to resist Communist aggression. The rest will go to the Philippines and Thailand, to help build forces strong enough to insure internal security.

As in the Near East and Africa, however, security in Asia is far more than a military problem. Our military assistance is essential to check the encroachments of Communist imperialism. But the long-run promise of stability and progress lies, not alone in arms, but in the provision of sufficient economic and technical support to enable the peoples of Asia to conquer their old, deep-seated and agonizing economic problems and to share in the benefits of an expanding world economy.

In India, for example, the key to economic progress lies in boosting food production. This is the only way to remove the constant threat of famine and ease the desperate struggle for a daily livelihood. It is the only way of freeing funds now spent to import food, so they can be used instead for productive investment in developing natural resources, transportation, and industry.

The whole future of India as a free nation may well lie in her ability to raise her food production and do it quickly.

We must support India's own efforts to get this done. The Indian Government has already set in motion a plan under which, in a very few years, she will be able to grow the food needed by her people, and will have established a sound basis for further economic development. It is a good plan, practical and definite. India itself is financing most of it. And we are greatly stepping up our aid for this plan with confidence that the sums we spend will bring concrete results.

This is an example of how our aid can produce large-scale results by supporting the efforts of the people of the Asian countries. In the same way, we are helping to expand irrigation in Pakistan, to eliminate malaria in Thailand, to increase rice yields in Burma.

It is vital that this work be carried forward rapidly. For in this region, there is still time to set in motion programs which will tap the energies of the people and give them solid hope for advancement under governments determined to resist Communist expansion. We must not let this opportunity go by default. Let it never be said of the American people that our eyes are focused only on what might have been—that we grow concerned about the countries of Asia only after they have been lost to the enemy. The bold and wise investment of American funds in this

region in the next few years can make a vital difference to the future of freedom.

Special note should be taken of the contribution that the new, free Japan can make to the growth of economic strength in Asia. A growing trade partnership of Japan with Southeast and South Asia can benefit everyone concerned. Such a partnership in free Asia can result in a self-supporting, expanding regional economy, free of permanent dependence on United States economic aid, and free from the danger of satellite slavery under the Soviet orbit.

### *Latin America*

I do not need to restate here the inestimable importance of Latin America. Its governments and its peoples are joined with us in the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty to bolster the security of the free world. It is a most important source of vital raw materials; and it carries on with us a large and mutually advantageous trade. In case of emergency, its military forces can partially relieve ours of some of the important tasks connected with hemisphere defense.

In order to assist hemisphere defense, I am recommending military assistance of 62 million dollars for the Latin American countries. In addition, I recommend 23 million dollars to carry forward the remarkable technical cooperation work now under way in 19 Latin American states to develop agriculture and natural resources, education, health, transportation, and other fundamental services. This includes 1 million dollars for our share of the technical cooperation work of the Organization of American States. This assistance—supplemented as it is by substantial amounts of private loans and investments and public loans through the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank—has already helped materially to raise living standards, speed economic development, and reduce vulnerability to undemocratic movements of the extreme right or the extreme left. The policy of the good neighbor has been one of our most successful policies; we must not falter in our loyalty to that policy today.

### **Conclusion**

The major national security programs I am recommending for the fiscal year 1953, including the Mutual Security Program, total about 64 billion dollars. This request raises once again the question whether the American nation can afford so much money for national security. This is a serious question. It requires a serious answer.

Certainly the total security program—of which the Mutual Security Program is a relatively small part—is by any standard a large one. It has resulted in some unavoidable economic dislocations

and inflationary pressures. Yet, the burden has been carried with remarkably little strain.

The fundamental reason for this is that our national production has been expanding rapidly, and will continue to rise. Security expenditures, measured in 1951 prices, rose about 18 billion dollars from 1950 to 1951; but the increase in our national output was even larger—totaling about 26 billion dollars. During the next 2 years, we can continue to raise output by not less than 5 percent annually, increasing the gross national product (at 1951 prices) to about 340-345 billion dollars in 1952, and to about 355-360 billion in 1953, compared with 327 billion in 1951 and 301 billion in 1950. If output rises at this rate, we will have increased our total annual production about one-fifth in 3 years. Even with the immense diversion to security purposes, production should be high enough, by the beginning of 1953, to permit total civilian consumption and capital investment at least 50 percent higher than during World War II.

There will certainly be cutbacks in some things. Yet, even if automobile production should drop to around 4 million units this year, it must be remembered that this is only slightly less than the average production of 1948 and 1949. If housing should dip below one million units, it must be remembered that we have succeeded in producing more than one million units per year in only 3 years of our history. And as we expand our output of vital materials such as steel and aluminum, we can again increase the output of such civilian items.

All in all, our present security expenditures are clearly within our economic capacity. And as our basic productive strength continues to increase in the years ahead, we should be able to carry more easily the substantial security costs which may continue to be necessary.

Let us consider for a moment the costs of possible alternatives to our present policy.

The alternative of premeditated and deliberate war is one which no democratic or God-fearing people can for a moment entertain. Even if we were insane enough to consider it, however, it would obviously entail expenditures immensely greater than our present ones, not to speak of the terrible waste and destruction of human life, property, and natural resources.

Another alternative—of contracting our commitments and retreating to the Western Hemisphere—has a momentary seductiveness, because it would seem to relieve us of the contributions we are now making to collective defense. But, in fact, if we followed the policy of retreat, we would have to try to replace the contributions to our security which now come from the cooperation of our allies. We could not replace some of those contributions at any cost; others only at very high cost, not just in money, resources, and military manpower, but in the precious political and eco-

conomic freedoms we are mobilizing to defend.

The policy of retreat would deprive us of armed forces which, if called upon to fight for the defense of their own countries, would at the same time be fighting for the defense of ours. It would deprive us of essential raw materials. It would impose upon us a much higher level of mobilization than we have today. It would require a stringent and comprehensive system of allocation and rationing in order to husband our smaller resources. It would require us to become a garrison state, and to impose upon ourselves a system of centralized regimentation unlike anything we have ever known.

In the end, when the enemy, encouraged by our retreat, began to organize the rest of the world against us, we would face the prospect of bloody battle—and on our own shores. The ultimate costs of such a policy would be incalculable. Its adoption would be a mandate for national suicide.

I am asking the Congress for 7.9 billion dollars for the Mutual Security Program—an amount which will bring returns no other policy could hope to produce so economically.

I am deeply convinced, after studying the matter carefully, that if there is any question about this amount, it is not whether it is too large, but whether it is too small.

These funds are needed—all of them—to pay for essential parts of the total undertaking to help free nations build adequate combined defenses. If the military assistance funds are reduced, this will mean a corresponding reduction in the effective combat forces which can be created in Europe and Asia, and a serious disruption of the timetable for achieving adequate defenses. If the defense support funds are reduced, it will mean that our partners in this endeavor will be unable to raise and train the scheduled forces or unable to expand their own military production as planned. If economic and technical funds are reduced, there will be a corresponding reduction in what we can do to help countries in Asia, the Near East, Africa, and Latin America to strengthen themselves, and a correspondingly greater danger of these areas falling to Communist aggression or subversion.

I would not counsel the Congress to spend one dollar more than is necessary to support our policy of peace. But there is no economy more false than that which is summed up in the tragic phrase, "too little and too late." Such a policy risks the loss of our investment as well as our objective. It would be foolish and dangerous to withhold a dollar now at the risk of expending, not just many times as many dollars, but human lives as well, a few years later.

The question is frequently—and properly—asked: How long are we going to have to continue this type of program? I cannot—no one can—give an answer in terms of a specific month and year. But I can say that one of the central pur-

poses in everything we are doing under the Mutual Security Program is to build strength which will eliminate the need for assistance from the United States.

This is not a program for carrying the rest of the world on our backs. This is a program for getting the other free nations on their own feet, so they can move ahead without special help from us or anyone else.

As the Mutual Security Program moves ahead—as larger military forces become equipped and trained, as economic strength continues to increase—we can expect the costs to the United States to decline. This is not only our own desire; it is also the natural hope and objective of the people of other countries. Free people do not relish dependence on other nations. They wish to achieve as rapidly as possible the economic health and vigor which will enable them to sustain their own programs of defense and economic progress. The Mutual Security Program will hasten the day when this will become possible.

History has thrust a fearful responsibility upon the United States. Today, the survival of freedom and civilization on this earth may depend on the initiative and decisions taken in our own Nation's capital. The free peoples look to us for leadership. Leadership implies more than a recognition of the problem. It implies also a capacity to work out a joint solution with our partners, and to stay with it till the end; it implies resolution and fortitude. We have shown that we understand the threat. But some are doubtful whether we will stay the course until we achieve peace in a free world.

I am not in doubt. I know that we shall succeed. It is perhaps true that our history has been characterized by impatience, by a passion for quick results. It is equally true, however, that it has also been characterized by perseverance and determination—the perseverance of the pioneer, making his steadfast way into the unknown West; the determination of the farmer and worker, transforming a savage wilderness into the strongest and most productive nation known to history. Perseverance and determination, steadfastness and dependability—it was these qualities, and not recklessness or imprudence, which built America. It is our obligation to turn these qualities outward. We must show the world that we can meet any crisis, and that temporary frustration will not drive us to panicky aggression or to ignominious retreat. This is the challenge of free world leadership.

In the last analysis, our leadership must stand or fall on the moral power behind it. No nation, of course, can undertake policies which are not squarely and solidly based on national self-interest. But world leadership in these perilous times calls for policies which, while springing from self-interest, transcend it—policies which serve as a bridge between our own national objectives and



the needs and aspirations of other free people.

I deeply believe that the Mutual Security Program is an expression of a new spirit in the world—a spirit based on faith in democracy and human decency, and looking to a new collaboration among nations and peoples. It expresses the deep reality of our friendship for other peoples—the sincerity of our determination to join with them in building a world where freedom, justice, and security will exist for all.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
March 6, 1952.

#### ADDRESS BY W. AVERELL HARRIMAN<sup>2</sup>

We are met at an extraordinary moment in history. Tremendous changes are taking place in the world. New institutions are being invented, new attitudes shaped as the free world labors to unite and organize its strength to deter Soviet aggression. The pace of history is now so swift that a man is hard pressed to keep up with it. Preoccupied as we are with the things which touch us immediately, we sometimes fail to comprehend the magnitude of events, and, seeing them separately, miss the pattern into which they fall.

Perhaps it is because I have just come back from the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon that I feel so keenly the sweep of history and our role in steering it. Our leadership is inspiring confidence that through unity of purpose and action a world war can be prevented and the foundations laid for peace.

At Lisbon new long strides were taken towards the security of the free world. Two profoundly significant factors affected the work of the conference:

The first was the determination of the governments of those ancient antagonists, France and Germany, to join with their neighbors in merging military forces in a single defense establishment. With a Franco-German understanding it becomes possible to bring Western Germany into the European Defense Community and to conclude the contractual agreement ending the occupation. Thus the full political, economic, and military potential of Western Europe can be utilized.

The second factor which made progress possible at Lisbon was development of procedures whereby the nations of the North Atlantic Community now sit down together, analyze their several capabilities and decide among themselves on a combined plan of action for common defense.

Thus when the Ministers met at Lisbon, they

<sup>2</sup> Made on Mar. 4 at Philadelphia, Pa., before a forum conducted by the Philadelphia *Bulletin*, and released to the press on the following day by Mr. Harriman's office. Mr. Harriman is Director for Mutual Security.

were able to go forward and to adopt a detailed plan of action for strengthening the security of the West. This plan called upon each of the participating nations to put forth further efforts and to ask for continued sacrifices by its people. This our partners are willing to undertake because they see clearly what can be accomplished and that this is worth the effort in creating a real deterrent to aggression. There was a new confidence, a new determination among the Ministers at Lisbon, a new conviction that by working together we can expand our economies year by year to meet the increasing defense effort, and in time improve the conditions of the people.

The conference at Lisbon has a very real importance for the citizens of Philadelphia and for everyone in the United States. We can feel more secure because our allies in Europe are going forward with us to build strong military forces to protect the Western World. This could not have been undertaken but for our inspiration and tangible help. If that inspiration flags and if that help is withdrawn, the whole defense structure and the faith on which it rests can be undermined. The great hope of peace would fade and only the Kremlin would profit.

It is the Kremlin's objective to frustrate the plans that have been set afoot by disrupting the great coalition of the North Atlantic. By every device in their power they are seeking to separate the nations who have come together for common defense. This is no time for us to falter. This is the moment to move forward and to consolidate the gains made over the past 5 years.

Two wars, in quick succession, are bitter proof that the only way to discourage aggression and to defend ourselves against attack is in company with others. No single country is big enough, or strong enough, or rich enough to guarantee its own security. The other nations of the free world have learned that same lesson. So, when a new version of the old tyranny arose to menace the world, there was a notable drawing together of the nations who cherished their freedom. When it became clear with Korea that the Communists would not shrink from outright aggression, this movement toward unity was greatly accelerated.

Who would have thought even a short time ago that we would see the Parliaments of France and Germany voting to accept the principle of merging their military forces into the European Defense Community? For centuries, the rivalry of those two countries has soaked the soil of Europe in blood. Yet in a split second of history we are seeing these ancient enemies being brought together by the common need for security from a greater danger.

It is high tribute to the farsighted vision of French statesmanship that the initiative for this step and the other revolutionary concept of the Schuman Plan came from France. It is remarkable, too, in the light of the long tradition of Ger-

man militarism, that a majority of the Bundestag does not want an independent German army, and has accepted the principle of combining their forces with those of their neighbors, for their own security as well as everyone else's.

It is true that there remain certain reservations by each side, but in the light of the fundamental agreement, these difficulties should be resolved.

The draft treaty setting forth the plan is virtually completed. This plan is for six nations, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to join in a European Defense Community with a supranational authority. There are plans for an assembly made up from members of the individual national assemblies. There will be a council of ministers with a defense commission to carry out the executive responsibilities of a defense department. There will also be a court to adjudicate differences and interpret the agreements.

The European Defense Community will be associated with the still larger but less tightly knit collective body, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, now streamlined and strengthened as the result of Lisbon. In fact the European Defense Community could not have been contemplated except within the context of the North Atlantic Community. The six-nation European Army will be a part of the total NATO force—the Eisenhower Army, as they call it in Europe. It is important not to get the two confused. The United Kingdom which is at the center of the British Commonwealth is not joining the European Defense Community but is making her contribution, just as we do, to the larger NATO forces under General Eisenhower, by stationing troops on the Continent.

#### **Work of the Temporary Council Committee**

Another thing to remember is the speed with which NATO has been developing. After all, it was only 2½ years ago that the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified by the member countries. After the surprise attack in Korea it became evident that defense preparations must be speeded. It was only a year ago that Eisenhower took over the command of the embryonic forces then being developed by each member country. Last September the Council at Ottawa recognized that it was necessary to reconcile an acceptable defense position for Western Europe with the capabilities of the member countries. A Temporary Committee of the Council was established to undertake this task. Each country was represented on this Committee. I was the United States member and acted as its chairman.

We set about our task by taking stock first of what military forces existed and then what resources of men, equipment, and finance could be made available for immediate build-up. This was the first time in history that free nations in peace-

time had joined together in submitting all the necessary information to analyze what the military program of each country was, whether it was effective, and whether each was doing its fair share.

An international military staff under General McNarney analyzed the military programs for the Committee. He pointed out the weaknesses that existed in the individual programs, and through open discussion, obtained agreement on far-reaching improvements in the plans of each participating country, including our own.

Things began to move without waiting for the completion of the report. Two countries undertook to extend their universal military service from 12 to 18 months. Other countries increased the number of their regular forces and extended the period of service for specialists, all with the objective of developing combat-ready forces as quickly as possible. Recommendations were made for priorities for equipment to be available to those units which would be trained and ready. An economic staff analyzed the military budgets and the economic capabilities and problems of each country, and pointed out in some cases that greater efforts were possible.

Working together, the Committee as a whole recommended individual and collective action in the economic field. Plans were made to promote the expansion of production and a generally expanding economy in Western Europe in order to carry the increased defense program and to overcome the economic difficulties confronting Europe. It became clear that Western Europe, just as this country, can substantially increase production if enough raw materials are available. All countries can work together to mutual advantage to increase the output of those essential materials.

The European countries agreed to increase their military effort as their production expands. Where a larger financial contribution was feasible, additional efforts were agreed to.

Thus the Temporary Committee developed a plan of action in the military field and in the financial and economic area through which we could build up the maximum balanced collective force as rapidly as possible. This means that each country will concentrate on the most important tasks which it is best qualified to undertake for the collective strength. We thus will obtain a maximum economy and elimination of the duplication which results from the simple combination of separate and independent forces developed on a nationalistic basis.

The Temporary Committee's plan of action was adopted by the Lisbon Conference. The member nations agreed to provide by the end of 1952 approximately 50 divisions—about half combat ready and the rest capable of rapid mobilization—and 4,000 operational aircraft in Western Europe, as well as strong naval forces.

Steps were decided upon to lay the foundation for further build-up in 1953 and beyond. It was

agreed to give more responsibility to General Eisenhower and the other NATO military authorities, and the civilian organization was greatly strengthened. It was agreed that the permanent organization should carry on continuously the type of review undertaken by the Temporary Committee, in order to set each year firm goals for the next year and the years ahead in light of changing conditions.

With Lisbon, NATO has moved from the stage of general planning to that of concrete action.

#### **Lisbon's Impact on the Mutual Security Program**

Now all of this which is happening in Europe has the most direct bearing on our situation here in the United States. Our great defense effort has two parts—the expansion of our own military forces, representing by far the major part of our defense expenditures; and then the contribution we make to our security by enabling other nations to strengthen themselves. This is the Mutual Security Program. This program is about 12 percent of our total budget for defense. In a very real sense, it is this 12 percent which makes the rest of our effort fully effective.

The myth that this country could somehow make itself safe by arming to the teeth and letting the rest of the world go hang has been pretty well exploded. We are dependent on the rest of the world for the very stuff of which our armaments are made. We couldn't arm ourselves to the teeth if raw materials from the rest of the world were denied us. That's just the way things are. Furthermore, if the productive resources and skills of Western Europe were to be added to those already controlled by the Kremlin, then our present preponderance of industrial capacity would be offset.

We cannot be secure while the rest of the world is insecure. We cannot be safe while the rest of the free world is defenseless. It is obviously and urgently to our best interest to make certain that the free world remains free and that our friends have the means to stand guard with us against the common danger.

Our investment in strengthening our friends and allies abroad is the best and least costly way to add to our own security. The weapons and materials which we send abroad make it possible for our partners to put forth a much greater and more effective effort. If we fail to continue this, then our own forces and our own expenditures would have to be drastically increased, and even then we could not obtain the same measure of security. Then, too, when the NATO forces are fully equipped we can hope for a lower level of our defense expenditures.

There are those who say we should spend our money only on our own defenses. They talk as if our defenses were steel and concrete. But our defenses are not steel and concrete—they are men.

Our planes are for men to fly. Tanks are for men to fight in. Guns are for men to shoot. To me it is the height of isolationism to reserve to the young men of our country the exclusive privilege of fighting for freedom. We have friends and allies in the world who are ready to fight. They are only partially equipped. They need equipment to make them effective allies.

There are those who complain about taxes for the Mutual Security Program. What better investment for the coming generation can we make than to provide them with well-equipped allies? But beyond this, I am convinced that if we carry on with our whole security program fully and effectively, we can prevent another world war. And it's the only way to prevent it.

#### **Main Provisions of MSP**

Later this week the President will recommend to the Congress the appropriation of just under 8 billion dollars for Mutual Security.<sup>3</sup> I do not see how we can do the job for less. Besides our support of NATO, the program includes extensive contributions to our security in the Far East, and limited amounts for the Middle East and South America.

By far the greater part of the program is to provide finished military items to help equip our friends and allies both in Europe and in Asia. This spells the difference between their having effective forces and ineffective forces. It spells the difference between discouraging further aggression or perhaps inviting it.

Another part of the program is to provide funds for materials to support the defense effort of our allies. Without this our friends could produce less equipment and train fewer men. We would be faced with the alternative of seeing weaker defenses in Europe, or sending more equipment or men from the United States.

The third part of the Mutual Security Program is technical and economic assistance to the underdeveloped countries—the Point Four Program. I will discuss this later on.

I have used the phrase "defense support." Let me explain what it is. By "defense support," is meant those contributions we are making to enable the Europeans to buy the raw materials they need to increase their military effort. If we provide the dollars to buy certain of the materials they lack, it makes it possible for them to produce equipment of far greater value and to put more men into the armed forces.

That's defense support—it's a different concept from the Marshall Plan. Under the Marshall Plan we gave these countries help to rebuild their economies. Now through defense support we are helping them expand their military programs for our mutual security.

<sup>3</sup>For text of the President's message to Congress, see p. 403.



## NATO Members' Share

All of us are concerned that each country do its share. In the Temporary Committee I found that the Europeans are equally concerned. It's hard to make a precise estimate. The situation is different in each country in terms of such things as gross national product, per capita income, pay of the armed services, available resources, and industrial capacity. We must remember that our gross national product on a per capita basis is over three times that of European members of the North Atlantic Treaty and, therefore, the defense effort is harder on the average European. But one thing I found was that they all had pride in their country's doing its fair share.

The French, for instance, are planning to spend more than the amount indicated by the Temporary Committee's analysis. The French are trying to raise forces large enough to balance those of Germany in the European Army and at the same time carry the heavy load of the long and costly war against communism in Indochina. Last week the French Assembly, with only the Communists dissenting, voted to approve this expanded defense program. It was on the question of who was to pay the necessary tax increase that the Government of Premier Faure was overthrown.

In spite of what we hear, the French people are paying heavy taxes. French taxes are collected in a different way from ours, much more from sales taxes than from income taxes. But in fact the French people pay a larger percentage of the national income in total taxes than we do.

The British were the first in Europe to enlarge their defense program. Their military production is now greater than that of all the other Western European countries put together. Britain is not only contributing to General Eisenhower's forces in Europe but is fighting Communists in a jungle war in Malaya and maintaining sizeable forces in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

There is a new spirit in Europe which the North Atlantic Treaty has imbued. Denmark, which has not had a military tradition, has instituted universal military service for the first time in her history. Her young men, now that they have modern weapons, are beginning to feel they can defend their country.

For their part the Norwegians, who share a common frontier with the Soviet Union, are determined to resist any attack. I heard in Norway an expression that if they are invaded, there will be a gun in every window.

To the original North Atlantic Treaty area have been added Greece and Turkey with their fighting forces on Europe's right flank. We are also sending military equipment to Yugoslavia. They have a large number of men under arms, but badly need modern equipment. When I saw Marshal Tito last summer, he made it clear to

me that he is determined to resist any Russian or satellite attack.

## The Point Four Idea

Not all of our Mutual Security Program is military, because not all of the threat is military. The Communists have many insidious techniques with which they seek to undermine the structure of freedom. They fish in troubled waters, and they find opportunities in many parts of the world. Over half the people of the free world are in slavery to hunger and disease. We are trying through the Point Four Program to help these people free themselves from that slavery and give them real hope for a better life, in place of the false hopes held out by the Communists.

There's a quotation I like from Jonathan Swift. He wrote:

Whoever could make two ears of corn, or two blades of grass, to grow upon a spot of ground where only one grew before, would deserve better of mankind than the whole race of politicians put together.

Swift had the Point Four idea 200 years ago. Today, we Americans, with our scientific knowledge, are literally helping people grow two ears of corn where one grew before. This is a new kind of international diplomacy, and will be more effective where people are hungry than all the old kinds of diplomacy put together.

Through our new kind of diplomats, farmers, and health officers, we are showing the peoples of underdeveloped countries how to increase their food production and how to stamp out the diseases which go with hunger and lack of modern knowledge. We are also helping them add to their wealth by expanding the production of the raw materials which they need and the world needs.

By this means we add to our own strength by creating new sources of supply for things which are vital to our production. We are building for our own future and insuring our own expanding economy by stimulating an expanding world economy. By freeing people from the slavery of hunger and disease we are creating the conditions in which freedom and stability can be maintained.

The point I want to emphasize is that this entire enterprise on which we and our friends are embarked offers the only clear hope for a peaceful world. The goal is in sight. I am satisfied that by and large our allies are doing their part. We must continue to do ours.

There are times when it seems that we in the United States are carrying a disproportionate share of the burden. By any reckoning the load will be heavy, if only because we are the strongest of the partners. With only one-tenth of the population of the free world, our gross national product just about equals that of all the rest of the free world put together. That is why we can afford to do what we are doing.

There are those who fear that this program is too great a drain upon our financial resources. I can only say that the money requested for the Mutual Security Program represents less than 2½ percent of our national output. This 2½ percent—only one-seventh of what we are spending on our own defense establishment—does not seem too much to pay for an essential part of our security.

There are many questions of detail about this program on which there may be differing views. But the overriding fact is that this is a program through which security can be achieved. It seems to me that we are at a critical moment in history—a moment when the decisions we now make will mold the shape of things to come. We stand today at one of those watersheds of history from which

the future will flow in one direction or another. It lies within our power to determine which direction it will take.

We have had difficult decisions to make before. We have not shirked them. For the last 5 years we have steadfastly pursued a course which is unprecedented in history. We have made great strides in the right direction. It is unthinkable that we should now turn aside.

Our program for peace is based upon strong and willing allies to stand guard with us on the frontiers of freedom. To the very degree that we have strong allies our ability to preserve our own freedom is reinforced.

Our future cannot be separated from the world's future. It is in our hands to make that future one of prosperity and peace.

## The Nature of Foreign Policy

*by Charles B. Marshall*

I shall define the foreign policy of the United States as the courses of action undertaken by authority of the United States in pursuit of national objectives beyond the span of jurisdiction of the United States.

That is a lot of big words. Let me put the idea another way. Our foreign policy unfolds in the things done by the U.S. Government to influence forces and situations abroad.

The meaning of the phrase "things done" should not be construed too narrowly. In this field, utterance is a form of action, and pronouncements may be deeds, especially when they convey meaning about intended or possible actions rather than merely expressing abstractions and moralizations.

My definition of foreign policy may sound strange. Let me justify it.

Foreign policy may be viewed as something distilled into chapters of a book or as a process involving a lot of daily hard work by many people. I am discussing it in the second sense—in the way that one might talk of a painting as the resultant in a process of putting paint on canvas, rather than as an ultimate effect hanging statically in a museum.

The two elements in my definition to be stressed are these: Foreign policy is generated in actions. The things acted upon in foreign policy are things lying beyond the direct control of this country.

Those two things are simple and obvious. Yet they are often overlooked. The overlooking of them leads to a lot of misunderstanding.

A year or so ago I spoke in a midwestern city. In the question period a lady in the audience asked

me to lay out briefly the course of policy for the next 10 years.

I declined, saying I could not foresee events that far ahead.

The lady reduced to 5 years the span of the prophecy she sought.

I disavowed clairvoyance even in that more modest degree.

She became impatient. She said surely I could tell something about the future—something to be counted on—something to be taken for granted by a policy planner such as I in the laying of plans.

I said there was indeed a sure element in the future: it was trouble; it was bound to occur; its timing, its points of arrival, and its guises were unpredictable; but that trouble would come was as safe a proposition as I could imagine.

My lady questioner became more impatient. She asked: If foreign policy was not a design to keep trouble away, then why have one—since one obviously could find trouble without the expense, effort, and time required for attending to foreign policy?

I said that the test for a nation as for an individual was not its success in abolishing trouble but its success in keeping trouble manageable—in generating the moral strength to face it and the capacity for handling it.

She spurned that answer. The lady said that if the Department of State was full of individuals like me, who took trouble for granted, that it was no wonder that the United States found itself in so much of it all the time.

A few weeks ago I had a different—yet in some ways similar—experience.

I took part in a round-table. Another participant appeared to hold me personally to blame for the shortcomings of what he described as a foreign policy of expediency.

My question as to whether he preferred a foreign policy of inexpediency did nothing to stem the tide of his scorn.

He said a foreign policy must consist of principles discovered in natural law and not susceptible of being compromised or tampered with and that the only way to conduct a successful foreign policy was to set these principles up as absolute standards of conduct and then persevere in them without regard to the limitations of circumstance.

The limitations of circumstance as a factor in foreign policy, he assured me, were figments of the craven mind that wants to avoid trouble instead of seeing national life as the opportunity of service to the eternal principles of right.

I did not fare very well in either of those arguments. In both cases the other participants were thinking about foreign policy only in terms of objectives.

I was thinking of foreign policy as relating to means and ends and to the gap between them.

#### **Meshing Concepts and Facts**

Ends are concepts. Means are facts. Making foreign policy consists of meshing concepts and facts in the field of action.

Suppose money grew on trees. Suppose power were for the asking. Suppose time could be expanded and contracted by a machine as in the story by H. G. Wells. Suppose Aladdin's lamp, the seven-league boots, and the other fairy-tale formulae for complete efficacy were to come true and be made monopolistically available to Americans. We would have then a situation in which we could do anything we wanted. We could then equate our policy with our goals.

In the world of fact, however, making foreign policy is not like that at all. It is not like cheer-leading. It is like quarterbacking. The real work comes not in deciding where you want to go—that is the easiest part of it—but in figuring out how to get there.

One could no more describe a nation's foreign policy in terms solely of objectives than one could write a man's biography in terms of his New Year's resolutions.

Foreign policy consists of what a nation does in the world—not what it yearns for or aspires to. The sphere of doing, as distinguished from the sphere of desire and aspiration, is governed by limits. Adam Smith pointed out that economic behavior derives from imbalance between means and ends and the circumstance that ends therefore tend to conflict. The same is true in foreign policy.

Let me illustrate that in terms of present problems.

To begin, let me identify the fundamental purpose enlightening our conduct as that of preserving a world situation and enabling our constitutional values to survive.

That we must keep in mind when speaking of national interest as the basis of our foreign policy. To me the phrase "national interest" does not mean a set of aims arrived at without regard to values. I cannot think of our foreign policy except in relation to the character of the Nation and its political institutions.

That has a bearing on the choice of means in the conduct of foreign policy. An accountable government cannot lead a double life. It is foreclosed from using such means as would destroy the very values it would save.

The main purpose enlightening our foreign policy holds true in all stages of our national life. It will continue as long as our country continues in the tradition we know. It is objectified in different ways as the world situation changes.

#### **Elements in the World Situation**

The world situation concerning us in the recent past and the present has been characterized by five main elements.

The first is the result of complex historic changes, notably two World Wars. A falling away in power among several nations once of primary greatness has occurred. This leaves two states of first magnitude, each with a great geographic span and great resources of power. One of these is our country.

The second relates to the situation of the other main element in this bipolar world of power, the Soviet Union. It is in the grip of tyrannous rulers. They achieved power by conspiracy. They have never dared risk their hold on power by resort to any procedure of consent. They have remained conspirators after becoming governors. They require tension and conflict within and at the periphery so as to hold onto power. They use in the service of this aim a political doctrine emphasizing the patterns of violence—class conflict, subversion, and so on.

As the third element, I cite the climate of intimidation and fear in much of the world resulting from the circumstance that the Soviet Union has great military forces either under direct control or amenable to its purposes and that these forces are deployed along a huge span bearing on northern and central Europe, the Mediterranean area, the Middle East, southeast Asia, and Japan.

Fourth, the dislocation of economic patterns and the exhaustion and demoralization of peoples in consequence of invasion, occupation, and oppression in World War II have created situations affording special opportunities for Soviet communism working within other countries as a conspiratorial force in the service of the Soviet rulers.

Fifth, the weakening of old restraints in Africa, the Middle East, and east Asia and the impulse



to wayward use of freedom among peoples unaccustomed to the usages of responsibility and preoccupied with redressing old grievances, real or fancied, have created opportunities for the Soviet Union, alert as it is to the quest of advantage in the troubles of others.

In these circumstances our endeavor has been along four general lines.

First, we have sought to develop stronger situations in the areas where the choices made by the peoples and governments in the great confrontation coincide with ours. We have done this so as to relieve the sense of anxiety—and with it the intimidatory power of the Kremlin—among the nations disposed to go along with us. In this category I put our alliances, military and economic assistance to our allies, and our efforts to return our former enemies to full relationships with other nations.

Second, we have sought to insure that the areas where the crisis of politics is sharpest—the areas of contest, such as southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the Arab areas—shall not be lost.

Third, we have sought to exercise leadership in working toward the ideas of responsibility and peaceful adjustment in contra-distinction to the Soviet pattern of turmoil and conflict. This aim enlightens our attitude of trying to combine responsibility with new found freedom among the Middle Eastern and the southeast Asian countries. It reflects itself in our support of the United Nations pattern, in our confrontation of aggression in Korea, and in our attempts to bring about a system of arms limitation that will not reward faithless performance.

Fourth, we have sought to steer away from the tragedy of another world war.

I am referring here not to objectives divided into neat categories distinct from each other but to concurrent phases of a process. That sounds very bureaucratic, but I do not know how better to convey the idea that in reality these things do not have such nice separateness as they seem to have when one talks or writes about them. These inter-related aims tend in part to support each other, and in part they also tend to contradict each other.

For example, at a certain point the pace of generating military strength may run counter to the requirements for a sound economic basis among our allies.

In another instance, the effort at countering aggression might be carried to lengths that bear against the aim to avoid a general war.

In still another, the impulse to deal sympathetically with the aspirations of a people new to freedom and not adjusted to its obligations may run counter to the economic necessities of another country which is allied with us or to the strategic necessities of our allies and ourselves.

Again, trying to help with the military needs

of one area may require the diversion of arms and supplies from others who also need them.

Such are the dilemmas that arise when our power is not sufficient for doing all the things we want to do.

### Finding Choices of Action

What requires judgment and timing in the highest degree, along with the fortitude that can defer hopes without surrendering them, is the job of threading a course through such contradictions as these and striving as best one can to find choices of action consistent with all of the aims concurrently.

That is the job of making the best of situations in the knowledge that such is the only way of making them better. The job consists mainly of the rationing of power among aims. There—not in the formulation of aims but in the rationing of power among aims—is where a foreign policy really takes form.

In my definition at the outset I said that the decisions were made under authority of the United States. That authority exists in the grant of the executive power to the President and in the grant of legislative power to the Congress. I shall wave aside the constitutional question and the political question of the paramountcy of authority in these matters.

The agencies and departments of the Government concerned in foreign policy serve as staff advisors to the President and, under his direction, to the Congress in the making of the fundamental decisions.

A staff function of this character carries duties but no prerogatives. The President and the Congress are entitled to seek counsel where they wish within the Government or outside it.

The same holds true within the Department of State. In making up his mind as to what advice to give the President, the Secretary is certainly entitled to seek counsel where he wishes.

I am one of several members of a staff which is only one among many elements within the Department of State producing advice for the Secretary of State. I am setting forth here not the conclusive word but only my own views, developed not in theory, but by observations.

As I see it, the job of making the decisions which generate foreign policy calls for two ranges of perception.

The first of these is the sense of the situation being dealt with. By that I mean knowledge of the background and of the local factors.

The second is a sense of perspective. By that I mean a grasp of the relation and proportions between the instant problem and all other problems arising in other places and foreseeable in other ranges of time and competing with the instant problem in the apportionment of power.

These two ranges of perception are not mutually

exclusive things. A situation can exist only in an environment. An environment entails a relation to other things. Moreover, a perspective can be taken only from a point in space or a moment in time—and a point in space and moment in time mean a situation. The differences between these two senses are differences in emphasis.

As I see it, the planning function in foreign policy relates to a particular sense of responsibility for the perspectives.

The usefulness of planning is as an essential ingredient in the process of bringing problems to decision. The job of keeping clear on proportions and relations is indispensable in this business. Only systematic and continuous forethought can insure that a problem will be viewed in all its implications before a decision is made and action launched. Without it, decision and action would all too likely be quixotically impulsive, and the resources of capability would all too likely be overdrawn and the policy itself rendered insolvent.

I do not suggest that this special attention to perspectives originated only when the Policy Planning Staff was established in 1947. No doubt the Jeffersons, the John Quincy Adamsses, and the Sewardss had resources to forethought in making up their minds.

In recent years, however, the concerns of the United States have become unprecedentedly various and their scope unprecedentedly vast. That circumstance accounts for the usefulness of having within the Department a staff with a frame of reference as wide as that of the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

It is exacting business. Our problems reflect upon and from each other like the facets of a crystal. An alteration in any facet shifts the light that shines from and through all the rest. The proportions and interrelation of our problems undergo unceasing change.

#### Limits of Planning

I take note of a fallacy that planning contains the remedy for all vexations and points the way around every dilemma. The idea that all our problems can be solved through the employment of total planning is persistently put forth. Since some planning is good, more would be better, and the most possible best of all—thus runs the reasoning.

Imagine trying to salt a stew according to that scheme of logic.

The limit of utility in planning inheres in this. At any moment it is possible to draw one's perspectives on the future in the light of the data at hand, but it is not possible to draw a perspective on what one's perspective will be at some later stage in time.

Wisdom cannot be stockpiled.

Brains are not susceptible of being carried around in a brief case.

There is no sound way of preempting judgment. It is not possible to tell better today how to handle a problem arising 6 months hence than it will be when the time comes.

It may be—it is—possible and necessary to keep proportions intact and up to date so as to have them ready for the moment of decision—but the judgment of the moment itself cannot be foreclosed.

I take note also of the notion that planning is a self-inductive process and that planners should stay remote from the arena of responsibility and plan and plan and plan in communion with other planners who plan and plan and plan.

Quite the contrary, the important thing is for the planner to keep the roots of his thinking in the exigencies of real problems.

I recall the story of the shingler who became so fascinated with his work on a foggy day that he shingled five feet beyond the eaves. That is what would happen if planning were carried on as a self-contained activity complete within its own system of logic.

The idea that planning can make everything tidy, answer all problems before they happen, foresee all eventualities, and prepare in advance the pat answer for every exigency is first cousin to the idea that power can be just as great as you want to make it.

Power is the capacity to achieve intended results. It is always limited. Not all the elements bearing on a nation's destiny can ever be brought completely within the nation's control.

Machiavelli pondered this in *The Prince*. He concluded that a .500 batting average on the field of destiny was about as much as might be hoped for.

The figure strikes me as too high, but many persons expect much more than the Florentine did.

I refer not to their personal expectations. Most people are not dismayed by having to manage their financial problems along month to month. People go on driving cars year after year without ever permanently solving their parking problems.

Yet some of my friends, and many persons in this country, some of whom write editorials or sit in seats of authority, persist in believing the desirable and achievable situation for the State to be one of perfect efficacy in its world relations.

When perfect efficacy is not obtained, these people feel dismay and sense betrayal.

I recall a story told in Mexico. A man heavy in need and great in faith wrote a letter asking for 100 pesos. He addressed it to God and mailed it. The postmaster had no idea how to handle the letter. He opened it, seeking a clue. He was touched by the man's story of need. He passed the hat among the postal employees. Thus 75 pesos were raised. These were placed in an envelope to await the return of the importuning man. A few days later he was back, inquiring for mail. He was given the envelope, opened it,

counted the money, and glowered. Then he went to the counter and scribbled out another letter. It read: "Dear God: I am still 25 pesos short. Please make up the difference. But don't send it through the local post office. I think it is full of thieves."

The expectation of perfect efficacy in the conduct of foreign affairs reflects itself in the "whodunit" approach to world problems.

#### Viewing Problems in Proper Proportions

I am concerned here, however, not so much with the tendency to ascribe to personal villainies all the difficulties of national existence as with the question of the proper proportions in which to view the problems.

This is consequential. As an accountable Government, our Government must stay within the limits permitted by public opinion. To the degree that unrealistic notions about what is feasible are factors in public opinion, unnecessary limits are imposed on the scope of action in foreign affairs, and rigidities harmful to our true interests result. This is borne constantly upon the mind of anyone having responsibilities in the making of foreign policy.

Several things occur to me as sources of the expectation of complete efficacy.

One of them is the consciousness of an extraordinarily successful past. The diplomatic course in the evolution from a colonial beachhead to a power of highest magnitude was one of matchless performance. Just as a man may lose his perspectives in calling up his departed youth, it is all too easy for us to lose a sense of proportion about our national problems by harking back to what we did when horizons were open and distance and the balance of power afforded us a shield.

Another influence I might call faith in engineering. That stems from our natural pride in the physical development of our country. Popular tradition treasures the idea that in the realm of creation all things are possible to those who will them. The margins available to us have made this almost true so far as the development of our own country is concerned.

Some of the popular ideas derived from science reflect this same material optimism. I think these are due not so much to the leaders of science themselves as to the popular interpreters of scientific achievement. From them we get the notion that cumulative knowledge can solve anything and that every problem is by definition solvable. Whatever may be the validity of this notion in the material relations which are the field of science, an error comes in trying to apply it as a universal.

Another contributing circumstance is that so much of foreign policy now stems from legislation. Legislation is law, law is to be obeyed, and an objective expressed in law is bound to be achieved. So goes the notion.

This idea bears particularly on congressional expectations in relation to foreign aid. The Congress has written into foreign aid legislation as conditions upon recipients many purposes whose consummation is devoutly to be wished. Some of these are such that they could be realized only in considerable spans of time and under governments with great margins of political power derived from energized and purposeful public support. The lack of such conditions in Europe is the heart of the difficulty. I find incredible the idea that phrases enacted by one country's legislature can *ipso facto* solve problems, the solution of which requires redressing the factors of political power in another country.

This topic came up the other day in a conversation with a friend of mine who serves very ably in the House of Representatives. He was perturbed at the lag among European nations in realizing some of the domestic and international reforms prescribed by the Congress in the foreign aid legislation. I commented along the same line as I have spoken here. He agreed with me. Then he added that the Congress would have to write the conditions tighter next time. Thus runs the endless faith in the compulsiveness of law.

Besides faith in making laws, let me mention faith in advertising. Where a perfume is marketed not only for its odor but also as a guarantee of domestic bliss, where automobiles are sold as means to capture the esteem of neighbors as well as means of transport, and where life insurance is offered not only as protection but also as a help for insomnia, it is natural to demand of foreign policy not only that it should handle the problems at hand but also that it should lead to a transfiguration of history.

#### Foreign Policy—A Responsibility, Not a Commodity

This idea and all its implications are fit to be spurned. I shudder whenever I hear anyone refer to "selling" our foreign policy. Let me say for my Planning Staff colleagues and for myself that we regard foreign policy not as a commodity but as a responsibility, the American public not as our customers but as our masters, and ourselves not as salesmen but as stewards.

I spoke along these lines recently to a very able group of business men visiting the State Department, Sloan Foundation Fellows from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. One of them commented that by disclosing its foreign policy too much in terms of moral purposes rather than in terms of actual problems to be handled within practical limits of capability, the Government itself encouraged the tendency that I was decrying.

That was a good point. I was reminded of the story that at the Battle of New Orleans, General Jackson, seeing that the targets were being missed, ordered his artillerymen to elevate the guns a little lower. That counsel applies here.



As one other influence, a very important one, giving rise to the expectation of perfect performance, I shall cite the confusion of force and power.

By force I mean first the capacity to transmit energy and so to expend it as to do vital harm to a foe, and second, the deterrent, compulsive effect exerted by the existence of this capacity.

The capacity for force is only one of many elements in a nation's power reservoir. The others pertain to its economic strength, the internal integrity of its political position, the degree of confidence and good will which it commands abroad, and many other factors.

A nation's intentions and its power interact on each other. What we seek is in part determined by what we can do. What we can do is determined in part by what we are after.

Furthermore, our own aims and power acting as functions of each other are in an interactive relation with adversary intentions and capabilities, which also relate to each other as interdependent variables.

Foreign affairs are a complex business. Gross errors result in the attempt to treat them on the basis of the misleading notion that all the problems of power can be reduced to the nice simplicity of calculations of force.

Wars occur when nations seek to impose their wills by effecting drastic changes in the ratios of power through radical action in the factors of force.

The force factors are susceptible of precision in military planning. The elements are concrete. The speeds of ships, their capabilities for carrying men and cargo, the distances, the fuel requirements of planes and tanks, and the fire power of divisions, and so on are known factors.

The military planning process, insofar as it relates to the ponderables of real or hypothetical campaigns, turns out tidy and complete results.

I do not mean that battles and campaigns are fought according to preconceived schedules. I mean only that insofar as advance planning is employed in the military field, the quotients are precise, the columns are even, and the conclusions concrete.

Furthermore, within the time and space limits of a campaign, the problem of force can be brought to an absolute solution. It really is possible to achieve the surrender of all of an enemy's forces or to eliminate armed resistance in a particular place for a particular time.

I speak here in no sense of professional disdain for military methods. I have served more of my life as a staff officer in the Army than in the line of foreign policy. I recognize the utility and necessity of military methods of thinking for military purposes. I am aware also of their limitations for other purposes.

It is easy for the unwary to jump to a fallacious conclusion that if all human affairs were laid out

with the precision of military plans, then all problems could be brought to as complete solution as can the problem of force in the conduct of a victorious military campaign.

This is the sort of thing one gets to when one tries to find the solution of all of the Nation's problems in the world, instead of taking the historically realistic view that the job is one of managing the problems, not of getting rid of them.

It is only a few steps from the notion of solution to the notion of employing force as a solvent.

This is an easy fallacy for those souls anxious for history to be tidy and all conclusions certain.

The exercise of force, however, is only an incident. The problems of power are endless. Wars only occur. Politics endures.

Some of my colleagues who bore with me as I tried out these comments thought I discounted too heavily the qualitative importance of objectives in foreign policy and reflected too somber an outlook.

Let me make the proportions clear.

I do not disparage the importance of objectives. Only in the light of ultimate purposes can one know how to proceed problem by problem in this field.

Moreover, I do not believe that good is forever beyond reach, but I am sure that the way to it is difficult and long.

The young Gladstone was advised by his mentor that politics was an unsatisfactory business and that he would have to learn to accept imperfect results.

That advice has wisdom for the conduct of a foreign policy.

The never ending dilemmas inherent in measuring what we would like to do against what we can do impose great moral burdens. These are beyond the capacity of some individuals to bear. Sometimes they become intolerable for whole societies.

The rebellion against that burden sometimes takes the form of an abdication of will, and relief is sought in a passive fatalism about the problems of national existence.

Again the rebellion may take the form of resorting to the counsel of violence as the solvent for the difficulties and restraints which life imposes.

In either form, the rejection is a rejection of life itself, for life imposes on nations, as on men, the obligation to strive without despair even though the way may be long and the burdens heavy.

To recognize this is in itself a source of strength.

As Keats tells us,

To bear all naked truths; And to envisage circumstance,  
all calm; That is the top of sovereignty.

•Charles B. Marshall, the author of the above article, is a member of the Policy Planning Staff.

## Dedicatory Ceremonies for the "Courier"

On March 4 President Truman welcomed to Washington the Voice of America's new floating transmitter, the U.S. Coast Guard cutter "Courier," with a world-wide broadcast.

As the President spoke, his voice was heard overseas by audiences in Europe, Latin America, and the Far East. Relay stations at Tangier, Munich, Ceylon, Manila, Honolulu, and facilities of the British Broadcasting Company beamed the President's message to listeners in all parts of the world via 37 transmitters. Immediately following the English language broadcast, the message was translated into 45 languages for rebroadcast.

The address highlighted a 45-minute program. Attending the ceremonies, which marked the tenth anniversary of the Voice of America, were Cabinet members, members of Congress, high military officials, and civic dignitaries. Other speakers included Secretary Acheson, F. Joseph Donohue, Commissioner of the District of Columbia, and Wilson Compton, Administrator of the U.S. International Information Administration, who presided. Text of the President's address and of Secretary Acheson's remarks follow:

### ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT<sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press by the White House March 4]

I am speaking to you today from a ship. It is a special kind of ship, and it will perform a very special mission.

This vessel will not be armed with guns or with any instruments of destruction. But it will be a valiant fighter in the cause of freedom. It will carry a precious cargo—and that cargo is Truth.

This ship is named the *Courier*. It is well named, for it will be carrying a message. It will be carrying a message of hope and friendship to all those who are oppressed by tyranny; it will be carrying a message of truth and light to those who are confused by the storm of falsehood that the Communists have loosed upon the world.

This vessel is a floating radio transmitter which is to broadcast programs for the Voice of America.

<sup>1</sup> Also printed as *Cargo of Truth*, Department of State publication 4525.

It will be able to move from place to place, beaming our Campaign of Truth to people behind the Iron Curtain whom we have thus far been unable to reach.

The *Courier* is a small ship—it is not as big as a destroyer—but it is of tremendous significance. Its significance lies in the fact that it will carry on the fight for freedom in the field where the ultimate victory has to be won—that is in the minds of men.

As the world stands today, free peoples must have strong military forces to protect themselves against aggression. But the final solution for the ills that plague the world can never lie in armies and navies and air forces. The final solution cannot be reached until all nations are willing to live together in peace. The final victory cannot be won until the truth has made all people free.

There is a terrific struggle going on today to win the minds of people throughout the world.

The rulers of the Kremlin are trying to make the whole world knuckle under to the godless, totalitarian creed of communism. They are busy everywhere spreading propaganda to stir up fear and hate and to set nation against nation.

The free nations of the world have not yielded to the onslaught of Soviet propaganda. We have undertaken to answer it with the truth—for we know that the truth is the best answer. To bring the truth to peoples everywhere, we are using magazines, newspapers, motion pictures, libraries, and information centers in all parts of the world. We must use every means to combat the propaganda of slavery.

This ship is an important part of that campaign. Our arguments, no matter how good, are not going to influence people who never hear them. The purpose of this ship is to help get our message through.

There is one thing I want this ship to say—over and over again—to our friends throughout the world, and especially to the people of the Soviet Union and those behind the Iron Curtain:

The United States of America is working night and day to bring peace to the world. As President of the United States, I say with all my heart that we yearn for peace, and we want to work with all nations to secure peace.

We have no quarrel with the people of the Soviet Union or with the people of any other country.

For almost two centuries the people of the United States have lived at peace with the peoples of Russia and China and the other countries whose rulers are now assailing us. Only a decade ago, when the peoples of Russia and China were suffering under two of the most savage invasions in history, we came to their aid. We helped them to save their countries.

I want to say to these people today, as we said then: We are your friends. There are no differences between us that cannot be settled if your rulers will turn from their senseless policy of hate and terror and follow the principles of peace.

Today, the aggressive policies of your rulers are forcing us to arm to defend ourselves. But we cannot find in our hearts any hate against you. We know that you are suffering under oppression and persecution. We know that if you were free to say what you really believe, you would join with us to banish the fear of war and bring peace to the earth.

Your Government, with its newspapers and radios, may try to make you believe that the United States is a hostile country, bent on war. But that is not true. I want you to know that our highest aim is peace and friendship—and an end to the horrors of war.

Wherever you may be listening to this broadcast, remember this: The people of the United States extend the hand of friendship to you across the seas. The future may look dark, but let us have faith together that all peoples will one day walk in the sunlight of peace and justice.

#### REMARKS BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press March 4]

We are dedicating the *Courier* to a task which is in the best tradition of our country. The men who founded this Nation, in promulgating the Declaration of Independence, acknowledged the necessity and propriety of "showing a decent respect for the opinions of mankind." This principle remains an important part of our foreign policy today.

We are engaged in a great effort to strengthen and unite the free people of the world, in order that peace may be secure against aggression, and that freedom may continue to flourish.

Our greatest ally in this effort is the truth. We have faith that wherever the people of the world can know the truth, they will support and sustain this great effort. That is why what President Truman has called "The Campaign of Truth" is a central part of our foreign policy today.

And that is the great mission of this ship, the *Courier*—to bear to the people of the world—to our friends who are free and those who are not free—the truth about what is happening in the

world, and about our efforts in behalf of peace and freedom.

The *Courier*, a ship of the sea that has been dedicated to the cause of peace, symbolizes our aspiration for the day when all our effort, and all our strength, may be devoted to peaceful and constructive ends. This is the ultimate purpose of all that we do.

On this occasion, the work of two men whose vision and energy helped to make the *Courier* a reality is deserving of tribute—Edward W. Barrett, who was until recently Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, and Howland H. Sargeant, Mr. Barrett's successor.

I know that the Campaign of Truth, as it is carried forward by the *Courier* and all the other media of communication, through the continued efforts of Mr. Sargeant and Mr. Compton, will continue to advance the best traditions and purposes of our country.

#### Tax Conventions With Finland

[Released to the press March 3]

On March 3, 1952, Secretary Acheson and Johan A. Nykopp, Minister of Finland in Washington, signed two conventions (treaties) between the United States and Finland for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion, one with respect to taxes on income and the other with respect to taxes on estates and inheritances.

The provisions of the income-tax convention are similar in general to those contained in income-tax conventions now in force between the United States and Canada, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The provisions of the estate-tax convention are similar in general to those contained in estate-tax conventions now in force between the United States and Canada, France, Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom. The two conventions with Finland are, in all respects, consistent with policies expressed by the U.S. Senate during the 1951 session of the Congress in connection with consideration of a large number of then pending tax conventions and protocols. (See S. Ex. Rept. No. 1, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.)

The conventions with Finland provide that instruments of ratification shall be exchanged. The income-tax convention provides that it shall become effective for the taxable years beginning on or after January 1 of the year in which the exchange of instruments of ratification takes place. The estate-tax convention provides that it shall become effective on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall be applicable as to estates or inheritances in the case of persons who die on or after that date.



## Agreement Reached on German Contribution to Defense

### QUADRIPARTITE PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ<sup>1</sup>

The negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the French Republic on the one hand and the German Federal Republic on the other, regarding the amount of the Federal Republic's financial contribution to defense in 1952/53, have now resulted in agreement.

The Federal Government has declared that it will base its defense contribution in the NATO year 1952/53 on the figure recommended by the members of the Executive Bureau of the Tcc [Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Council]. This means that, in addition to those expenditures for defense purposes in the regular public budget of the Federal Republic, there will be an average monthly defense contribution of 850 million deutschemarks following establishment of the European Defense Community. It is proposed that the amounts of future total German defense contributions will, of course, be established under the same principles as apply to all participating countries.

In the meantime, the three powers will exercise their best effort to maintain at the lowest possible figure their Occupation costs for the period prior to the coming into effect of the treaty establishing the European Defense Community.

### TEXT OF TCC REPORT ON GERMANY

*On February 16 the Executive Bureau of the Temporary Council Committee (TCC)<sup>2</sup> of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization made the following report to Secretary Acheson, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of France, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden of the United Kingdom, and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany, who were meeting at London.<sup>3</sup> The three Foreign Ministers and Chancellor Adenauer reviewed the report on February 18 and 19 and agreed that it should be made public on February 19.*

1. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Allied High Commission have requested the

<sup>1</sup> Issued at Lisbon and Bonn on Feb. 26; printed from telegraphic text.

<sup>2</sup> The members of the Executive Bureau—W. Averell Harriman, Sir Edwin Plowden of the United Kingdom, and Jean Monnet of France—were joined during some of their discussions on Germany by Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr., U.S. special representative in Europe.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the quadripartite communiqué on these meetings, see BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 325.

members of the Executive Bureau of the Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, acting in their personal capacities, to examine the financial and economic capacity of the Federal Republic to make a global contribution to Western Defense in the financial year 1952/53 which would be comparable with the contributions of the principal member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was requested that our recommendation be based on the same factors and considerations which were used in arriving at the defense contribution of other countries.<sup>4</sup> A memorandum was submitted by the Federal Republic suggesting a defense contribution of DM 10.8 milliards for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1952, together with various economic and financial data.

2. The procedure we have followed has been the same as that followed in the examination of the position and abilities of other countries. Likewise we have used the same definitions for the defense contribution as has been applied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to all countries. This does not imply that any government expenditures excluded by such a definition necessarily have a lower order of priority, or that they can be neglected in assessing the ability of any country to contribute to defense. As requested, we have considered the defense contribution only for the year 1952/53, recognizing that the amounts for future years and their method of determination must be established at a later date.

3. The major task of the Temporary Council Committee has been to determine the maximum defense contribution within the politico-economic capabilities of the countries participating in the common defense effort so as to develop the defensive strength required to deter aggression. A basic principle underlying that common effort has been the equitable sharing of the defense burden among the participating countries since an effective collective effort is possible only if all countries play their full part. The concept of maximum effort within politico-economic capabilities means, however, a recognition of the need for expanding total output so that the defense programs of the participating countries could be carried out without weakening the basic economic structure of such countries. It was recognized that temporarily slower progress towards some otherwise attainable improvements in the social and economic life of the various countries would be involved. However, it was considered that such slower progress was inevitable, given the need to achieve the task of providing an environment of security within which the aspirations of the free peoples for peace and human progress will be realized.

4. In assessing the maximum politico-economic capabilities of the various countries for the Temporary Council Committee, a large number of factors had to be considered. The principal ones were the total economic output of the country and its composition; the possibilities

<sup>4</sup> For text of the North Atlantic Council's press release summarizing the Tcc recommendations for building NATO's defensive strength, see BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 368.

*Comparative Gross National Product and Defense Expenditures (October 1951 prices)*

	1950/51 (Actual)	1951/52 (Estimated)	1952/53 (Estimated)
<i>United States</i>			
(a) Gross National Product (milliards of \$) . . . . .	291	305	323
(b) Defense Expenditures (milliards of \$) . . . . .	20	44	57
(c) Defense Expenditures in proportion to National Product. . . . .	6.9%	14.4%	17.6%
<i>United Kingdom</i>			
(a) Gross National Product (millions of £) . . . . .	12,750	13,100	13,450
(b) Defense Expenditures (millions of £) . . . . .	965	1,431	1,731
(c) Defense Expenditures in proportion to National Product. . . . .	7.6%	10.9%	12.8%
<i>France</i>			
(a) Gross National Product (milliards of Francs) . . . . .	10,250	10,800	11,400
(b) Defense Expenditures (milliards of Francs) . . . . .	750	1,145	1,250
(c) Defense Expenditures in proportion to National Product. . . . .	7.3%	10.6%	11.0%
<i>Germany</i>			
(a) Gross National Product (milliards of DM) . . . . .	96.3	101.8	*107.3
(b) Defense Expenditures (milliards of DM) . . . . .			11.25
(c) Defense Expenditures in proportion to National Product. . . . .			10.5%

NOTE: Gross National Product is taken at "factor cost". The defense expenditures shown above represent actual expenditures for 1950/51 and estimated expenditures for the two following years. Actual expenditures for the current year will not be known until the fiscal year is over. It is currently expected that expenditures in the present year may lag slightly in the United Kingdom because of

production difficulties that have been encountered in the case of major equipment items, though those lags will be made up in the following periods. In the United States, production difficulties have also been encountered. In the case of France, it seems evident that the budgeted defense expenditures for the present year will be exceeded, due to heavy costs being incurred for the war in Indo-China.

\*The proportion of German defense expenditures to Gross National Product would be less if, as the members of the Executive Bureau believe, the German Gross National Product reaches a level significantly higher than the German official forecast given above.

for expanding that output; the real per capita income; the practical possibilities of diverting additional resources to defense; the balance of payments position; the Government financial situation; and certain special factors in cases of particular countries. It is evident that these diverse considerations cannot be incorporated in any simple formula to give a ready calculation of the appropriate defense effort. They do, however, provide the basis for broad qualitative assessments. It is on the basis of such qualitative assessments, after careful study of all the relevant factors, that the levels of defense expenditure for all countries were appraised. We have been guided in considering the size of the German contribution, by the same motives and factors.

5. The striking feature of the German economy is the important advance it has made in the last few years in attaining a level of production consonant with its resources and technical skills. Although still lagging behind other countries, the volume of production already is above that of 1938 and substantially exceeds the level of 1936. On the other hand, mostly because of the influx of refugees, the population of the Federal Republic is not far from 25% larger than pre-war so that while current production levels appear quite favorable, the volume of total output must take care of the needs of this enlarged population.

6. Production had fallen to extremely low levels as a result of wartime destruction and the dislocations of the immediate post-war years, and the recovery process in Germany started later than in other countries. Since 1948, however, progress has been exceptionally rapid. The gross national product in real terms has risen at an average of 16% a year. Although rates of increase were larger in the earlier years, industrial production in 1951 was more than double that of 1948. On the financial side, too, the chaos of the immediate post-war years has been overcome. A successful monetary reform has been carried out and the Federal Republic has achieved a high degree of financial stability. It is significant that the shock of the Korean crisis in mid-1950 affected the cost of living much less in Western Germany than in most other countries.

7. Similarly, with respect to the balance of payments, the serious problem which faced the Government of the Federal Republic has yielded to the policies and efforts directed toward its solution. The need for foreign support has substantially declined. Exports have had a striking expansion over the past three years and, though they leveled off toward the close of 1951, the overall foreign payments position in that year was in approximate balance. The balance of trade with the dollar area in 1951/52 is expected to show a deficit of less than \$300 million against which there will be considerable net dollar receipts on invisible account.

8. In summary, it is apparent that the economy of the Federal Republic has made great strides in overcoming the tremendous difficulties of a few years ago, a tribute to the energy and hard work of the German people. Nonetheless, the German economy is confronted with several special problems which we have carefully weighed in assessing its ability to contribute to the common defense on a fair and equitable basis. It must be recognized, however, that difficult problems exist in every country and these have had to be taken into account in appraising their defense efforts. This is not to deny that the German problems with regard to the large influx of refugees, the vital needs of reconstruction and the support of Berlin have a special force.

9. Probably the most important of these, which affects the economy in many ways, is the problem of the nine million persons that have been added to the population as a result of their expulsion or flight from the East. The refugee problem is significant from an economic standpoint quite apart from the tragic situation created for many families. It is the essential reason why there is still heavy unemployment, averaging about 1.4 million workers during 1951, despite the fact that industrial production is above pre-war levels. Both the population increase involved and the heavy unemployment are reflected in a lower per capita income than would otherwise obtain and a level of per capita income that is somewhat below that of comparable countries of Western Europe. The added population has meant also that a high level of investment was required to provide not only housing but opportunities for productive employment. The fact that

*Increase in Defense Expenditures from Year to Year*  
(October 1951 Prices)

	Percent	
	1951/52	1952/53
<i>United States</i>		
(a) Percentage increase in defense expenditures above previous year. . . . .	120	30
(b) Proportion of annual increase in national product absorbed by increased defense expenditures . . . . .	171	72
<i>United Kingdom</i>		
(a) Percentage increase in defense expenditures above previous year. . . . .	48	21
(b) Proportion of annual increase in national product absorbed by increased defense expenditures . . . . .	133	86
<i>France</i>		
(a) Percentage increase in defense expenditures above previous year. . . . .	53	9
(b) Proportion of annual increase in national product absorbed by increased defense expenditures . . . . .	72	17

a significant number of refugees have not yet been integrated into the economy has resulted also in a need for relatively high taxes to finance a high volume of transfer payments.

10. On the other hand this inflow of population has also had favorable effects in the Germany economy. The bulk of the new population has been absorbed into the economy and is making an important contribution to increased production. In fact, it is largely because they have contributed to a larger working force that the level of total German production is above pre-war. Their role in the attainment of higher production will continue as the further absorption of refugees takes place.

11. A special problem of comparable importance is that of continued reconstruction and investment requirements. The damages incurred by Germany in the course of the war were extremely severe and a greater volume of reconstruction remains to be done than in other countries. As has been mentioned above, investment needs have been augmented by the large inflow of refugees. Great progress has been made in fulfilling these various capital requirements, as is shown, for example, by the present level of construction of approximately 350,000 dwelling units a year. The high proportion of investment which made that progress possible has been one of the factors accounting for a comparatively lower level of consumption. The economy is now well beyond the initial stages of recovery. It is the experience of other countries that the percentage of investment can decline as economic rehabilitation proceeds, although its absolute level may be maintained or even increased. From now on, it is probable that in Germany it will be possible to meet essential requirements for investment with a somewhat smaller proportion of an expanding total national product.

12. The problem of Berlin is one of great difficulty, arising from the combination of its special geographic situation and the hard core of unemployment which exists there. We commend and attach great importance to the efforts of the Federal Republic to maintain and improve the economic position of Berlin, and to the continuance of financial aid by the Federal Republic for this purpose. Part of the expenditures of Berlin actually fall within the commonly applied definition of defense expenditures and such expenditures, whether met out of Federal support or out of the Berlin Municipal budget, should be included as part of the defense contribution of the Federal Republic. Most of the budgetary and other support given to Berlin, however, does not fall within the definition of defense expenditures, but it does largely exceed what is normally done to assist distressed areas, and this burden has been taken into account as an excep-

tional factor in assessing the ability of the Federal Republic to contribute to defense.

13. In assessing the comparative capability of the Federal Republic, the existence of considerable unemployed resources in Germany must be counted as a potential asset. There is a considerable difference in the burden represented by additional defense effort that can be provided by the output flowing from formerly unemployed people and previously idle capacity than when it must be provided by diversion from the existing use of resources. Of course, difficulties stand in the way of the immediate use of unemployed resources. An important difficulty in Germany is the severe shortage of dwelling units which seriously limits the mobility of labor. Although a similar problem exists in other countries, it is not of the same degree of severity as in Germany. There is a problem of training labor as well as one of redistributing skilled manpower. In addition, production facilities and equipment must be provided if the unemployed are to make an effective contribution. Consideration must be given to the extent to which bottlenecks in various sectors of industry might hamper further expansion. The recent increases in coal output and the forecast of a sizeable further expansion during the present year are encouraging. The problem of power will require special attention. Adequate direction of the large volume of investment to enable the bottleneck problems to be solved will be necessary so that effective use can be made of industrial capacity. All these things will take time, but in the end, the existence of unemployed resources provides the reservoir out of which an expansion of total production can occur.

14. The extent to which Germany's defense effort can be increased is in some measure dependent upon the likely effect of this expansion upon the balance of payments. The increase in economic activity to which defense expenditures will lead will involve some increased demand for imports to meet consumer demand and to furnish additional raw materials. Imports may be further stimulated by the lifting of restrictions which have been applied to trade with the member countries of the European Payments Union. Nevertheless, there will be important compensating factors. Exports should continue to rise as a result of increased production and favorable prices in Germany as well as high demand from other countries. Increasing production of coal will contribute to an improvement in the balance of payments. The direct impact of the defense contribution on the export industries in the period under consideration will not be such as to affect markedly export prospects. As in the case of the overall balance, the problem of the dollar balance of pay-



ments is less severe than for most North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries. Dollar income can be expected to increase as a result of increased transfers by American troops stationed in Germany, and possibly by United States off-shore purchases. It is not to be expected, therefore, that either the overall or the dollar balance of payments will prevent the attainment of a higher level of German defense expenditure or that they are likely to set limitations of the kind experienced by certain other countries.

15. In summarizing the prospects for the German economy, therefore, it is apparent that a relatively high rate of expansion in total output can be expected. It is estimated in the memorandum of the Federal Government that the overall increase of the gross national product from 1950/51 to 1952/53 would be 11.4%. This estimate appears to be overly conservative. Although the exceptionally high rates of increase of the past few years cannot be anticipated, it must be recognized that Germany is still in the stage of recovery from a dislocated economy and low level of production. It is the experience of all countries in such circumstances that progress is very rapid under the stimulus of adequate demand. The carrying out of the defense program itself should contribute materially to the expansion of total output. The conclusion that a higher rate of expansion than that forecast is probable is strengthened by a comparison with the rise in national output occurring in countries where unused resources are not available to nearly the same extent and where bottlenecks are more severe than in Germany. The fact that industry plays such a predominant part in the Western German economy, constituting almost half of the national product, is an added reason for expecting a more rapid expansion. With regard to the expansion anticipated in non-industrial sectors, particularly services, a considerably larger increase than that projected by the Federal Government is probable. The progress made in the recovery of industry so far will allow a greater share of additional resources for expansion in the service sectors. The development of transportation and distribution cannot lag far behind industrial expansion. Consumers' services are now expanding rapidly with the rise in consumers' incomes. Furthermore, the rapid rate of residential construction also contributes to raising the level of services as the newly constructed homes become occupied. It appears, therefore, that inadequate weight has been given to the contribution that services will make to the development of the national product. In view of all these aspects of the problem, it is reasonable to expect an economic expansion in Germany that is well above the expectations of certain other major countries.

16. The rapid increase in the level of output will facilitate the solution of budgetary problems connected with the increase in the defense effort, particularly since the structure and rates of taxation are such as to increase public revenues by a large proportion of the rise in national product. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that there is a financial problem to be overcome in securing an adequate level of defense, especially in the initial stages of a defense buildup. All countries have faced the implications of the sharp increase in total government expenditures which go with such a buildup. Because of the present sound state of the government finances and the recently enacted tax increases, the Federal Republic is in a favorable position to face this problem. Present budgetary plans for 1952/53 for all levels of Government, as submitted, include provision for debt retirement, at a substantially higher rate than in previous years and the net deficit foreseen is of modest proportions. The steps now being taken to provide for an increase in the share of taxes collected by the Laender which are transferred to the Federal Government have been designed to make possible the financing of increased defense expenditures by the Federal Government. There is no question but that

the level of taxation in Germany is already high. It is noted, however, that out of the additional revenue, estimated by the Federal Government, three-quarters are expected to come from the expansion of the national product as forecast by the German authorities. It is recognized that the proposed budgets of the Bund, Laender and Communities contain a considerable amount of expenditure which cannot easily be reduced, partly on account of the special help given to refugees and to Berlin. However, bearing in mind that a large part of the forecast increase in tax receipts is at present budgeted to be spent on non-defense items, measures such as have been taken by other countries could produce some economies in non-defense expenditures. Should additional revenues be necessary, for defense purposes, tax measures bearing on luxury consumption and less essential investments would both reduce the potential deficit and would be appropriate, on economic and social grounds, to a period of defense buildup. There is full agreement that inflation must be avoided and that fiscal policies must be supplemented by adequate credit policies to this end. In the light of these considerations, the budgetary problem raised for the Federal Republic by a fair and equitable defense effort appears to be of manageable proportions.

17. We have given full recognition to the present level of production in Germany and the call made on it by the special burdens it has to bear. We have felt, on the other hand, that additional tasks can be more easily met when their fulfillment can bring in hitherto unused resources than when a diversion of such resources and restriction of other uses is required. Furthermore, other requirements are of a lower relative weight than in the past and the obstacles to further development appear less severe than in most countries. It is our best judgment that the global contribution by the Federal Republic to defense within its financial and economic capabilities, in the financial year 1952/53 beginning July 1, and which would be comparable with the contributions of the principal member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is DM 11.25 milliards measured at October 1951 prices. The foregoing is governed by the definitions of defense expenditures used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

18. We consider that this represents a fair share for Germany in the common effort. Moreover, the increased effort it represents over 1951/52 is comparable with the added burdens undertaken by other countries in the early stages of their defense buildup.

19. There is no precise way of measuring the absolute or relative contribution to the common defense effort being made by the various countries. The ways in which the efforts are being contributed differ as to the burden they represent on available and potential resources. There are also important human and social values to be considered as well as the more strictly economic and financial ones. However, despite recognized statistical limitations, the data on the total production of the various countries and the relation of defense expenditures of total production do give important indications of comparative burdens. The relevant data for the principal countries showing the percentage of total output that will be devoted to defense, the portion of the expansion of output going to increased defense, and the rates of increase in defense expenditures are given in the attached table.

20. Taking all factors into account, including comparison with the defense efforts of other countries, the recommended defense contribution for Germany is, in our judgment, within its politico-economic capabilities on the basis of the criteria used by the Temporary Council Committee. The requirements of an effective defense cannot be met without effort. The recommended defense contribution would place Germany among the larger nations which, in their relative contribution to the joint effort, are leading the way in providing for the common defense.

## Protocol Supplementing Consular Convention With Ireland

[Released to the press March 4]

On March 3, 1952, there was signed at Dublin by the plenipotentiaries of the United States and Ireland a protocol supplementary to the consular convention between the two countries which was signed at Dublin on May 1, 1950.

The convention of 1950 is presently under consideration in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (S. Ex. P., 81st Cong., 2d sess.). The provisions of that convention followed, in general, the pattern of an earlier consular convention which had been concluded between the United States and the United Kingdom and which was pending in the Senate in 1950 at the time the convention with Ireland was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Thereafter, it appeared that questions would be raised with respect to certain provisions appearing in both of those conventions. The provisions in question related to the authority of consular officers in connection with the administration of estates. In order to obviate any possibility of controversy which might prejudice unduly the consideration of the conventions and delay needlessly the final action necessary to bring them into force, it was decided that the provisions with respect to which questions were likely to be raised should be deleted from the conventions. In the case of the convention with Ireland, the protocol signed on March 3, 1952, achieves that objective. The protocol will be submitted to the Senate for consideration in conjunction with the convention to which it relates and of which, in effect, it is to be an integral part.

## British Policy on Malaya Welcomed

*Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson*<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. Government has noted with interest the clear statement of policy and objectives contained in the directive issued on February 4 by the United Kingdom Government to the new High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya. We are heartened by the reiteration of Britain's determination to defeat Communist terrorism in Malaya, an alien movement which for nearly 4 years has conducted a deliberate and vicious campaign to disrupt the life of the country and retard its political and economic development. We welcome the statement that this objective is not to be achieved by military action alone, but also by

an imaginative and progressive policy of assisting the diverse peoples of Malaya toward the longer range objective—that of forging in due course a united and self-governing Malayan nation, which will have the choice of remaining within the Commonwealth.

The U.S. Government is fully cognizant of the importance of Malaya's present and future role in the free world, politically, economically, and strategically, and of the significance of the present struggle in Malaya as an integral part of the free world's common effort to halt Communist aggression. This is not a concern and responsibility only of the so-called "West," but a struggle which vitally affects the lives and progress of all free peoples, who must therefore strive in concert to achieve their mutual aim.

We consider that the efforts being made by the British and their associates among the peoples of Malaya represent a major contribution in that common struggle. We have confidence in the ultimate success of their efforts, both to halt the forces of communism and to build a new nation, and we wish to take this opportunity of expressing our solidarity of purpose with those engaged in these efforts.

## "Germ Warfare" Charges Called Fabrication

*Statement by Secretary Acheson*

[Released to the press March 4]

The Communists are seeking through every device known to Communist propaganda to persuade the Korean people and the people of the world that the U.N. Forces are using bacteriological warfare in Korea.

We have heard this nonsense about germ warfare in Korea before. We would not bother to deny it again were it not for the fact that the Communists are spreading these charges around the world at the same time they are stalling in the truce negotiations. I would therefore like to state categorically and unequivocally that these charges are entirely false; the U.N. Forces have not used, and are not using, any sort of bacteriological warfare.

When similar charges were fabricated in the past, we made it clear that we would welcome an impartial investigation by an international agency such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Communists, fully aware of the false nature of their charges, of course refused. We again challenge the Communists to submit their charges to the test of truth by allowing such an impartial investigation.

Unfortunately, these false charges reflect a very sad situation for the Korean people in Communist

<sup>1</sup> Made on Mar. 5.

hands. The inability of the Communists to care for the health of the people under their control seems to have resulted in a serious epidemic of plague. The Communists, not willing to admit and bear the responsibility that is theirs, are trying to pin the blame on some fantastic plot by the U.N. Forces.

Our deepest sympathy goes out to all those behind the enemy lines who are sick and suffering. We offer them the hope that our efforts toward a just armistice will succeed and make it possible for health, as well as peace and security, to be brought to all of Korea. These are the goals of the United Nations for all the people of Korea.

### **Agreement With Honduras For Civil Aviation Mission**

Assistant Secretary Edward G. Miller, Jr., for the U.S. Government, and Ambassador Rafael Heliodoro Valle, for the Republic of Honduras, signed on March 7 an exchange of notes for the establishment of a Point Four civil-aviation mission in Honduras. The negotiations which led up to the agreement were conducted in this country by Capt. Roberto Galvez, Director of Civil Aviation in Honduras, with officials of the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. Captain Galvez, a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is the son of President Juan Manuel Galvez of Honduras. The Institute of Inter-American Affairs administers the Point Four Program in Latin America as the regional office of the Technical Cooperation Administration.

The agreement provides for the establishment of a mission of U.S. experts to advise and to consult with the office of the Director of Civil Aviation of Honduras and to aid in developing a program of civil aeronautics in Honduras.

Officials of the Civil Aviation Administration of the Department of Commerce said today that the use of aviation for passenger travel and freight carrying in Honduras is widespread. They stated that three local airlines service 30 locations within the country and that many of these towns and cities have no other means of communication with the rest of the country. In addition to the local services, Honduras is served by three international carriers.

A chief of aviation mission is to be sent to Honduras as soon as arrangements can be made. He will call on other experts from a pool of aviation technicians now being formed to service the Central American countries and eventually will establish a permanent mission composed of technicians in the special fields for which there is greatest need.

### **Nine Countries To Share In Secured Fund in Japan**

*[Released to the press March 7]*

The U.S. Government, acting under the authority granted to it by the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission, has issued an interim directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan instructing him to distribute the Secured Fund. This Fund, which amounts to approximately 3½ million dollars, has accumulated from the sale of property in Japan which the Japanese forces looted from Allied territories during the war but which it has been impossible to identify as property looted from any particular country. In view of this situation the Far Eastern Commission by policy decisions authorized the nine countries whose territory was looted by Japan and from which originated the various items of unidentifiable property to agree on the distribution of the Fund.

Since the nine countries concerned have not reached an agreement on this problem and the office of the Supreme Commander, the custodian of the Fund, will terminate as soon as the Treaty of Peace comes into force, the United States considered it to be necessary to provide for the distribution of the Fund before the Occupation in Japan should end. Therefore, the United States, in accordance with the authority given to it to issue an interim directive in cases of urgency, has instructed the Supreme Commander to distribute the Secured Fund among the nine countries concerned in accordance with the following schedule of shares expressed in percentage terms: Australia 8%; Burma 12%; China 20%; France 8%; India 8%; Netherlands 12%; Pakistan 8%; Philippines 12%; United Kingdom 12%.

### **U. S.-Canadian Joint Boards On Pollution of Boundary Waters**

*[Released to the press March 3]*

Pursuant to the approval given by the United States and Canadian Governments<sup>1</sup> to the proposals made by the International Joint Commission in regard to the correction and prevention of pollution in the waters of the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, the Detroit River, the St. Mary's River from Lake Superior to Lake Huron, and the Niagara River from Lake Erie to Lake Ontario, the International Joint Commission has established the following Advisory Boards to the International Joint Commission on Control of Pollution in Boundary Waters:

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 10, 1951, p. 947.



# FOR THE UNITED STATES

## Chairman

L. F. Warrick, U.S. Public Health Service, Washington, D.C.

## Member

Hayse Black, U.S. Public Health Service, Cincinnati, Ohio

## Members for Questions Concerning St. Mary's River, St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair and Detroit River

John M. Hepler, Michigan Department of Health, Lansing, Mich.

L. F. Oeming, Michigan Stream Control Commission, Lansing, Mich.

## Members for Questions Concerning the Niagara River

Earl Devendorf, New York State Department of Health, Albany, N. Y.

C. R. Cox, New York State Department of Health, Albany, N. Y.

## FOR CANADA

## Chairman

J. R. Menzies, Department of National Health and Welfare, Ottawa

## Members

W. R. Edmonds, Department of National Health and Welfare, Ottawa

Dr. A. E. Berry, Ontario Department of Health, Toronto  
A. V. De Laporte, Ontario Department of Health, Toronto

The Advisory Boards to the International Joint Commission on Control of Pollution of Boundary Waters will replace the Technical Advisory Boards on Pollution of Boundary Waters, which have now completed their task under the pollution references, to the complete satisfaction of the Commission.

**EDITOR'S NOTE.** These appointments were made in carrying out the provisions of article IV of the treaty of January 11, 1909, which provides that "the waters herein defined as boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other."

## Letters of Credence

### Pakistan

The newly appointed Ambassador of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali, presented his credentials to the President on February 27, 1952. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 148 of February 27.

March 17, 1952

## CORRECTION

In the BULLETIN of March 10, 1952, page 389, left-hand column, following the paragraph under Article XXIX, the following should be inserted:

In witness whereof the representatives of the two Governments, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed this Agreement.

Done at Tokyo, in duplicate, in the English and Japanese languages, both texts authentic, this twenty-eighth day of February, 1952.

## FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

(SEAL)

DEAN RUSK

EARL D. JOHNSON

## FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN:

(SEAL)

K. OKAZAKI

## Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Mar. 3-8, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (\*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

No.	Date	Subject
143	2/25	ICAO meeting
148	2/27	Pakistan: Letters of credence (rewrite)
158	3/1	Ceremony on the <i>Courier</i>
159	3/3	Canada: Joint boards-water boundary
160	3/3	Finland: Tax convention signed
†161	3/3	Germany: U.S. bondholders' committee
†162	3/4	St. Lawrence interagency committee
163	3/4	Acheson: "Courier" ceremonies
164	3/4	U.S. del.: Mathematical union
165	3/4	Pt. 4 director for Jordan (rewrite)
†166	3/4	Allison: The U.S. and the Far East
*167	3/4	Acheson on Schoenfeld death
168	3/4	Ireland: Consular convention protocol
169	3/4	Acheson: Germ warfare in Korea
170	3/5	Acheson: British policy in Malaya
171	3/5	Acheson: Oliver Edmund Clubb
†172	3/6	Sargeant oath of office (rewrite)
*173	3/7	Vietnam: Anniversary message
174	3/7	Japan: Distribution of secured fund
†175	3/7	Compton: U.S. Information Program
176	3/7	Cohen appointment
177	3/7	Honduras: Civil aviation mission
†178	3/8	Hoey: Remarks on Indochina
179	3/8	U.S. educators to Hiroo
†180	3/7	Cuba: Military assistance agreement

## Thirty-fourth Report of U. N. Command Operations in Korea

FOR THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 16-30, 1951<sup>1</sup>

U.N. doc. S/2507  
Transmitted January 28, 1952

I herewith submit report number 34 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-30 November, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 1084-1098, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Progress was made in negotiating a military armistice. At the plenary session of 27 November 1951 both delegations ratified an agreement on agenda item number two.

The agreement on agenda item number two is as follows: "The Delegation of the United Nations Command and of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers reach the following agreement on the second item of the agenda, fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as the basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

1. The principle is accepted that the actual line

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the Security Council by the deputy U.S. representative in the Security Council on Jan. 28. For texts of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th reports to the Security Council on U.N. Command operations in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43; and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. Reports nos. 1-11 are published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108, respectively. The 12th, 13th, and 14th reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the 15th and 16th reports, *ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the 17th report, *ibid.*, Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the 18th, *ibid.*, May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, *ibid.*, May 21, 1951, p. 828; the 19th report, *ibid.*, June 4, 1951, p. 910; the 20th report, *ibid.*, June 11, 1951, p. 948; the 21st report, *ibid.*, July 2, 1951, p. 30; the 22d, *ibid.*, July 23, 1951, p. 155; the 23d and 24th reports, *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1951, p. 265; the 25th report, *ibid.*, Aug. 20, 1951, p. 303; the 26th report, *ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1951, p. 510; the 27th report, *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1951, p. 709; the 28th and 29th reports, *ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1028; the 30th, 31st and 32d reports, *ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; and the 33d report, *ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395.

of contact between both sides (as determined under either paragraph two or three, as appropriate) will be made the military demarcation line and that at the time specified in the signed armistice agreement both sides will withdraw two kilometres from this line so as to establish the demilitarized zone for the duration of the military armistice.

2. If the military armistice agreement is signed within thirty days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone determined by the sub-delegation on the basis of the above stated principle and in accordance with the present line of contact (as indicated in the attached map and explanatory note), the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone shall not be changed, regardless of whatever changes may occur in the actual lines of contact between both sides.

3. In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice agreement, if the military armistice agreement is not signed within thirty days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone as determined in paragraph two above, the sub-delegations shall revise, immediately prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement the above military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both sides, so that the revised military demarcation line will coincide exactly with the line of contact between both sides immediately prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement and will constitute the military demarcation line for the duration of the military armistice."

The agreed line of contact runs in general from the Sa-Chon River on the west, thence northeast to a point about six miles north of Chorwon, thence generally east to a point north of Kumhwa,

thence northeast to Kumsong, thence generally east to a point north of the Punch Bowl region, thence northeast to a point on the coast at Pocejini.

At the close of the period delegations were in process of discussing agenda item three: "Concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease fire and armistice."

Action continued to reflect the more aggressive enemy attitude noted during the preceding period. Relatively strong local attacks were launched against UNC positions with increasing frequency. The majority of these attacks occurred during the hours of darkness in the Western and Eastern sectors. Immediate United Nations Command counteractions on the Western front nullified local enemy gains in a matter of hours. The enemy attacks on the Eastern front failed to reach main United Nations Command battle positions. A limited attack by United Nations forces on the central front succeeded in advancing positions approximately two miles on a seven-mile front in the Talchon area. With the exception of this advance and a slight planned withdrawal in the Kaesong area, the front lines remained substantially unchanged.

On the Western Front, as elsewhere, daylight action consisted principally of patrol clashes. The United Nations Command patrols harassed enemy units and supplied a steady flow of intelligence relating to the enemy's strength, disposition and activities in the battle area. The Kigong area remained the site of the most aggressive enemy action, with, as in the preceding period, armour-supported enemy units making repeated attempts to seize forward United Nations Command positions. During the latter part of the period, the enemy drew on additional local reserves to continue these efforts, but despite the persistence of the enemy actions and initial gains which he made during several of his attacks, the period ended with all United Nations Command positions intact.

Action on the Central front was highlighted by a United Nations Command attack on a seven-mile front in the Talchon area. By the end of the second day of this attack (18 Nov.), all objectives had been secured, thus moving the battle line northward about two miles in this sector. The attack apparently took the defending enemy units by surprise, as evidenced by the relatively large number of prisoners captured and the large number of casualties inflicted on enemy elements defending this narrow portion of the front. The enemy was unable to react in any appreciable strength until after the conclusion of the United Nations Command advance. Thereafter, the enemy made numerous unsuccessful attempts to retake positions in this area. On the remainder of

the Central front, aggressive patrol action by United Nations Command and hostile units, often resulting in bitter clashes dominated the battle scene.

The heaviest fighting on the Eastern front occurred in the Kosong and Tupo areas. In the former area, United Nations Command elements on a three-mile front executed a planned withdrawal of approximately two and one-half miles on 17 November. Hostile units rapidly followed up the United Nations Command withdrawal and subsequently made repeated attempts to breach the new positions. In all such instances attacking units failed to reach the main United Nations Command battle positions. In the area southeast of Tupo, the enemy made numerous night attacks. Although no forces of major size were involved in these enemy efforts, fighting was nevertheless prolonged and relatively intense. The enemy's determination to secure and retain positions in this area was vigorously demonstrated when it required two days of stubborn fighting for United Nations Command elements to restore a single position in the Tupo area.

There was no evidence during the period to suggest any diminution of the enemy's offensive potential. However, the enemy gave no indication that he would attempt to exercise this offensive capability in the near future.

United Nations Command Naval Forces on blockade patrols of North Korean coasts continued to prevent the Communists from utilizing sea communications. Day and night bombardments disrupted North Korean coastal highways and rail routes, and provided close artillery support and night illumination in support of front-line action near Kosong and the mouth of the Han River. United States destroyer *Hyman* was hit by return fire at Wonsan without casualties or serious damage resulting, but the city continued to take heavy damage as the siege of the port entered the fortieth week. Hungnam also received very severe punishment as thousands of rockets, shells, and bombs were poured into military target area.

Naval and Marine aviators accounted for many troop casualties, transportation stoppages, and industrial targets. Their claims included a large lumber mill near the south shore of the Choshin Reservoir, a mining plant at Kilchu, factories near Hungnam, scores of trucks, rail cars, bridges and supply and ammunition dumps. Again, downed pilots were rescued from icy seas, and picked up miles inland by helicopters that dared enemy fire and turbulent winds to accomplish their mission.

In spite of freezing weather, heavy seas, and poor visibility, United Nations Command vessels carried on with their difficult and dangerous tasks of minesweeping, rescue, resupply and patrol. The Republic of Korea Navy continued to take an able and substantial part in these operations which, although little publicized, are essential parts of the teamwork which permits major combatant vessels,



such as the newly reported battleship *Wisconsin*, to steam close in to the North Korean beaches to extend the inland range of their guns.

United Nations Command aircraft under the operational control of Far East Air Forces continued round the clock attacks on enemy installations throughout North Korea with greatest emphasis placed on rail and highway interdiction and airfield neutralization. Some increase in the night close support effort was required and our aircraft flew more than 1,290 sorties in close support of the United Nations Command ground forces. One enemy jet fighter base in North Korea was active for a few days during the period. Communist fighter reaction was spotty and heavily dependent on weather. The daily sighting of MIG-15 interceptors ranged from zero on five days to a maximum of 180, which were encountered on the eighteenth. Weather was favourable for visual daylight attacks on most days, but clouds restricted operations on the twenty-second and twenty-third and all but stopped combat flying on the twenty-fifth when freezing rain and snow blanketed most of Korea.

During the period the air interdiction programme was directed at paralyzing the enemy rail network south and east of the Chongchon River and the destruction of trucks and other vehicles along enemy highway supply routes. In daylight, United Nations Command fighter bombers made multiple cuts along open stretches of the rail lines and attacked locomotives, rolling stock and supply buildings. Medium and light bombers augmented this destruction by attacking key rail bridges and marshalling yards along the interdicted routes. These attacks accounted for approximately 1,685 rail cuts, destruction or damage to forty-seven bridges, 532 rail cars, sixty-five locomotives and damage to more than 1,700 supply buildings. Night intruder air craft continued to seek out and attack enemy truck convoys. These missions accounted for the greater portion of the 2,528 vehicles which were reported destroyed during the period.

Persistent Communist ground force night attacks on advanced outposts of the United Nations Command Army have been countered by increased close support with medium and light bombers.

The runways of jet airfields at Saamcham, Taechom, and Namsi have been kept in an unserviceable condition. Uiju airfield on the south bank of the Yalu River became operational for jet fighters early in the period. During a low level attack on this airdrome on the eighteenth, our aircraft destroyed four MIG-15 jet fighters and damaged four others. On the night of 23rd-24th November, the runway at Uiju was made unserviceable when heavy concentrations of 100-pound

general purpose and 500-pound air bursting bombs were dropped by Far East Air Force aircraft.

During the past two weeks United Nations Command pilots have shot down nine MIG-15 interceptors and damaged twenty three others in air-to-air battles. On 30 November United Nations Command jets shot down nine conventional enemy aircraft in a single engagement.

There was little change in the employment of reconnaissance, rescue, or combat cargo aircraft. No enemy air attacks were reported against United Nations Command forces and bases.

The large number of prisoners of war detained by the United Nations Command has necessitated the establishment of specific United Nations Command procedures for the disciplinary control of these prisoners. The United Nations Command, therefore, during October 1951 prepared and promulgated a penal code governing the conduct of prisoners of war, together with trial regulations governing the trial of prisoners of war for post capture offences by United Nations military commission. A United Nations Command procedure for the imposition of nonjudicial punishment and regulations governing the penal confinement of prisoners of war were also promulgated in October 1951. Copies of these documents are being forwarded. The provisions of these directives are in strict accordance with the terms of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war of 12 August 1949, which is being adhered to by the United Nations Command as governing the treatment of prisoners of war detained by the United Nations Command.

During the protracted delay in reaching agreement on agenda item two in the armistice negotiations, United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeaker, and radio broadcasts continued rapid dissemination of factual news accounts of the Panmunjom discussions. These media explained the determination of the United Nations Command delegation to press for an equitable, effective, and early solution, so that needless sacrifice of lives can be avoided. After Communist acceptance of the United Nations Command formula for solution of agenda item two, United Nations Command media lent vigorous support to efforts to expedite agreement on the remaining substantive items of the agenda, calling attention to the heavy loss of life sustained by the enemy during more than four months' delay on item two.

Supplies and equipment are being imported under a programme of relief and economic aid to Korea. These imports are to apply against the civilian needs, to encourage industrial rehabilitation, and to further the development of a self-sustaining and healthy economy.

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### International Mathematical Union

On March 4 the Department of State announced that the first general assembly of the International Mathematical Union will convene at Rome, Italy, on March 6, 1952. The members of the United States delegation are as follows:

#### Delegates

**Marshall H. Stone, Ph.D., chairman;** chairman, Department of Mathematics, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

**Einar Hille, Ph.D.,** professor, Department of Mathematics, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

**John R. Kline, Ph.D.,** chairman, Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.

**Saunders MacLane, Ph.D.,** professor, Department of Mathematics, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

**Gordon T. Whyburn, Ph.D.,** professor, Department of Mathematics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.

#### Alternate Delegates

**Nathan Jacobson, Ph.D.,** professor, Department of Mathematics, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

**W. R. Transue, Ph.D.,** professor, Department of Mathematics, Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio

The purpose of the forthcoming meeting is formally to organize the International Mathematical Union, which came into being on September 10, 1951. Consideration will be given to numerous administrative, organizational, and policy matters which must be settled in order to insure the effective operation of the newly created organization. Specific agenda items include election of officers of the Union, adoption of rules of procedure, determination of the unit contribution, establishment of an operating budget, application for membership in the International Council of Scientific Unions, and formulation of a scientific program.

### European-Mediterranean Air Navigation Meeting

On February 25 the Department of State announced that the third European-Mediterranean Regional Air Navigation meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) will convene on February 26, 1952, at Paris, France. The United States delegation is as follows:

#### Delegate

**Clifford P. Burton, Chief, Airways Operations Division,** Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce, *Chairman*

#### Alternate Delegates

**James F. Angier, Establishment Engineering Division,** Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

**Henry S. Chandler, Chief, International Standards Branch,** Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

**James L. Kinney, Representative, Flight Operations, ICAO,** Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

**Delbert M. Little, Assistant Chief of Operations, Weather Bureau,** Department of Commerce

**Edmond V. Shores, Aeronautical Communications Specialist,** Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

**Clement Vaughn, Commander, United States Coast Guard,** Department of the Treasury

#### Advisers

**Robert G. Armstrong, Capt., USN, Head, Civil Aviation Liaison Branch, Flight Services Division,** Department of the Navy

**William B. Becker, Operations Specialist, Domestic and International Standards, Operations Division, Air Transport Association of America, Inc.**

**James O. Beckwith, Col., USAF, Assistant Chief, Flight Operations Division, Directorate of Operations,** Department of the Air Force

**Robert L. Froman, Associate Director, Bureau of Safety Regulations, Civil Aeronautics Board**

**Thomas A. Kouchnerkavich, Electronics Engineer (International), Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce**

**Newton A. Lieurance, Commander, USN, Head, Weather Communications and Intelligence Unit, Flight Services Division, Department of the Navy**

**William J. McKnight, Special Representative, Aeronautical Radio, Inc.**

**Donald Mitchell, Assistant Chief, Aviation Division, Safety and Special Radio Services Bureau, Federal Communications Commission**

**LaVern C. Moore, Lt., USN, Head, Non-Tactical Communications Requirements Unit, Plans and Readiness Branch, Department of the Navy**

**Justus W. Smith, Maj., USAF, Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe, Wiesbaden, Germany**

**Seymour Stearns, Maj., USAF, Communications Liaison Branch, Directorate of Communications, Department of the Air Force**

**Roland E. Sturtevant, Chief Adviser, London International Field Office, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce**

**Vernon I. Weihe, Electronic Systems Engineer, Air Navigation and Traffic Control, Air Transport Association of America, Inc.**

At the first (Paris, April 1946) and second (Paris, May 1948) European-Mediterranean Regional Air Navigation meetings, the then existing air navigation facilities and services in the region were surveyed, and such improvements as were considered necessary for the regularity and safety of air navigation were recommended. On the basis

of reports and recommendations formulated at the two meetings, plans for the development of air-navigation facilities and services in the region were subsequently adopted by the Council of ICAO.

The forthcoming meeting has been called by ICAO for the purpose of reviewing the extent to which the recommended plans have been implemented, reexamining the requirements for air-navigation facilities and services in the light of current aircraft operations in the region, and recommending to the Council of ICAO such amendments and revisions of the regional plans as may be deemed necessary. One of the outstanding accomplishments of the meeting is expected to be the drawing up of an air traffic control plan for Western Europe.

### **Communiqués Regarding Korea To the Security Council**

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2479, January 15; S/2512, February 4; S/2513, February 4; S/2517, February 11; S/2518, February 11; S/2519, February 11; S/2520, February 11; S/2525, February 13; S/2528, February 15; S/2531, February 20; S/2532, February 20; S/2533, February 20; S/2534, February 20; S/2536, February 20; S/2537, February 21; S/2538, February 26.

### **Benjamin V. Cohen Named to U.N. Disarmament Commission**

The President on March 7 appointed Benjamin V. Cohen as deputy U.S. representative to the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. The U.S. representative to the Disarmament Commission is Ambassador Warren R. Austin, permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations.

The Disarmament Commission was established by a resolution adopted by the Sixth General Assembly on January 11, 1952, and was directed to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty or treaties for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; for the elimination of all weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and for effective international control of atomic energy to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The President described the nature of the U.S.-U.K.-French proposals which resulted in the establish-

ment of the Disarmament Commission in a Nationwide broadcast on November 7, 1951. The Commission takes the place of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments which have been abolished.

The first meeting of the Disarmament Commission was held in Paris on February 4, 1952, but dealt solely with procedural matters. The next meeting will be held in the near future in New York.

It is expected that Mr. Cohen will devote his full time to his new assignment for which he will have the personal rank of Ambassador.

## **Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography<sup>1</sup>**

### **General Assembly**

- Report of the Economic and Social Council (Chapter IV). Report of the Third Committee. A/20029/Rev. 1, January 3, 1952. 11 pp. mimeo.
- Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1952. Supplementary Report of the Fifth Committee. A/2002/Add. 1, February 2, 1952. 30 pp. mimeo.
- The Problem of the Independence of Korea. Letter dated 25 December 1951 to the President of the General Assembly from the Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A/2038, January 5, 1952. 13 pp.
- Complaint of Aggressive Activity and Interference in the Domestic Affairs of Other Countries by the United States of America, as Instanced by the Appropriation of \$100 Million to Finance the Recruitment of Persons and the Organization of Armed Groups in and Outside the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Other Democratic Countries. Letter dated 26 December 1951 from the Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the President of the General Assembly. A/2051, January 10, 1952. 11 pp. mimeo.
- Abolition of Corporal Punishment in Trust Territories. Report of the Fourth Committee. A/2060, January 15, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.
- Administrative Unions Affecting Trust Territories. Report of the Fourth Committee. A/2062, January 16, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.
- Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily Available. Report of the Sixth Committee. A/2089, January 29, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

<sup>1</sup> Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.



# The United States in the United Nations

February 27-March 14, 1952

## Trusteeship Council

When the Tenth Session of the Trusteeship Council opened under the Presidency of Sir Alan Burns (U. K.), on February 27, 1952, the new Conference Building at United Nations Headquarters was witnessing its first meeting. The major portion of this session of the Council will be concerned with the review of the annual reports on the administration of the four Trust Territories in the Pacific. These territories are New Guinea and Nauru, under Australian administration, Western Samoa, administered by New Zealand, and the United States-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. In examining the reports on these Territories the 12-member Council will take into consideration the report of its Visiting Mission sent to these territories in 1950, as well as petitions received from the inhabitants of the territories. The United States is represented on the Trusteeship Council by Ambassador Francis B. Sayre.

At its opening meeting the Council refused to consider the usual Soviet motion to unseat the representative of China, and adopted a United States-sponsored proposal bringing about an indefinite postponement of the question.

Examination of the report on Western Samoa began on March 4 and that on New Guinea March 11. During the general debate on the report on Western Samoa, the general view expressed by Council members was that the Administering Authority was discharging its obligations satisfactorily and that marked progress had been achieved in the field of political advancement. Discussion of the report on New Guinea is expected to be concluded by March 17.

Examination of the report by the United States on its administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is expected to begin on March 20. At that time Senator Elbert D. Thomas, High Commissioner of the Trust Territory, in his capacity as Special Representative of the United States for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, will make a statement outlining the progress that has been made in the Territory during the year under review (July 1, 1950 through June 30, 1951). Following that statement the High Commissioner will be available to answer questions by the various representatives on the Council relating to the administration of the Territory.

In addition to its examination of annual reports the Council has several other significant items on its agenda for the tenth session. A resolution passed by the Council on March 3 provided for the arrangements for the forthcoming Visiting Mission to West Africa. This Mission, which will arrive in Togoland not later than September

1, 1952, will make a study, pursuant to a resolution of the recent General Assembly, of the Ewe and Togoland unification problem. Pursuant to another General Assembly resolution the Council has adopted new procedures to facilitate the examination of petitions. A Standing Committee on Petitions, empowered to meet between sessions of the Council, has been established. In accordance with other General Assembly actions the Council has adopted resolutions (1) requesting its Standing Committee on Administrative Unions to prepare a draft of the report requested by the Assembly on administrative unions between trust territories and adjacent colonial areas; (2) authorizing its Committee on Rural Economic Development of Trust Territories to invite, where appropriate, specialized agencies to contribute or to participate in its study on the rural economic development of the trust territories; and (3) requesting the Secretary General to undertake further efforts to provide suitable information on the United Nations, and the International Trusteeship System in particular, for dissemination among the inhabitants and in the schools of the trust territories.

Under study by committees of the Council is the General Assembly resolution on the organization and functioning of Visiting Missions, together with an Ecosoc resolution recommending the consideration of the nomination of women as members of visiting missions, and the revision of the Provisional Questionnaire which guides administering authorities in preparing the annual reports on the trust territories under their administration.

Some consideration has also been given to the General Assembly resolution inviting the Trusteeship Council to examine the possibility of associating the inhabitants of the Trust Territories more closely in its work. There will be further discussion of this item at subsequent meetings of the Council.

## Economic and Social Council

*Subcommission on Freedom of Information and the Press*—The fifth and final session of the Subcommission convened at United Nations Headquarters, March 3, for a 3-week period. Mr. Carroll Binder, Editorial Editor of the *Minneapolis Tribune*, is the American member of the Subcommission, which consists of 15 experts who serve in their individual capacities, and not as representatives of governments.

The purpose of the meeting was to consider the redrafting of an international code of ethics. Mr. Binder recalled his serious doubts that such a document would find general acceptance. He observed, however, that since the Subcommission was committed to the task, it should draft the

code simply and concisely and avoid ambiguous and vague terms.

After extended discussion, the draft of international code of ethics containing a preamble and four articles, was adopted March 14 by a vote of 7-0-3 (Mr. Binder, U.S.). It states, *inter alia*:

(1) Freedom of information and of the press is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of all the freedoms consecrated in the Charter of the United Nations and proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . (2) All engaged in gathering, transmitting, disseminating and commenting on news and in describing contemporary events by the written word, by word of mouth or by any other means of expression shall do their utmost to ensure that the information the public receives is factually accurate. (3) Fidelity to the public interest is vital to a high standard of professional conduct. (4) Deliberate calumny, slander, libel, unfounded accusations and plagiarism are serious professional offenses. (5) The reputation of individuals shall be respected, and news regarding their private lives likely to harm their reputation shall not be published unless it is in the public interest, as distinguished from public curiosity, to do so. (6) All engaged in the gathering of information about countries other than their own, or in commenting on them, shall make the utmost endeavor to acquire the necessary background knowledge conducive to accurate and objective reporting and comment concerning such countries. (7) No provision of this code may be interpreted as justifying governments to intervene in any manner whatsoever to ensure that the personnel of the press and of other media of information comply with the moral obligations set forth herein.

The proposal of the U.S.S.R. member, Mr. Zonov, for a new article 1 was rejected 1 (U.S.S.R.)-8-2. It required that "workers in the press and information services shall base their work on the principle that their fundamental obligation" is to combat war propaganda, fight for the exposure of fascism, develop friendly relations between nations, combat discrimination, etc. Mr. Binder criticized Mr. Zonov's proposal as an attempt to commit the United Nations to the Soviet concept of the role of the press.

The Subcommission, March 13, adopted a recommendation to the Economic and Social Council that "an international professional conference be held not later than the end of 1953 to prepare and accept a final text of an international code of ethics for journalists." This recommendation, which was opposed by Mr. Binder and Mr. Zonov, was approved by a vote of 6-2-4.

*The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)*—The Economic Commission for Europe began its seventh session in Geneva on March 3. The Commission had before it the task of evaluating the work of its technical committees and of reviewing the "Economic Survey of Europe," a survey put out by the ECE secretariat.

The discussions on the Survey brought out a Soviet charge that the secretariat was biased and incompetent. Soviet anger was due to the fact that this year the secretariat had found it necessary, because of a lack of adequate statistics and other information from Soviet sources, to analyze the Soviet economy in a chapter separate

from those chapters dealing with the economy of Europe as a whole. The separate chapter, while unemotional and completely objective, showed that a huge percentage of Soviet productive resources is being used for armament.

During the discussions on the technical committees, the Executive Secretary of ECE, Mr. Gunnar Myrdal, pointed out that the Iron Curtain countries had largely withdrawn their support from the technical work of ECE. The inference was clear that the Iron Curtain countries were primarily interested in ECE as a political instrument and as a propaganda forum.

### Security Council

*The Disarmament Commission*—The first meeting of the Disarmament Commission, consisting of the 11 members of the Security Council and Canada, was held in Paris on February 4. At that time (1) the Rules of Procedure were adopted; (2) it was agreed that meetings of the Commission would, in principle, be open; and (3) that the chairmanship would be rotated on a monthly basis.

The second meeting was held on March 14 at U.N. Headquarters to consider the work of the Commission in conformity with General Assembly resolutions of January 11 and 19, 1952. Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, U.S. deputy on the Commission, opened the general discussion and submitted this Government's draft proposal for a plan of consideration by the Commission. He noted that its language was deliberately designed to cover the essential elements of any balanced disarmament system without prejudging the details. "The United States," he said, "believed any proposals any government might wish to advance could be considered under the appropriate headings of the plan." He recalled that the sixth General Assembly had directed the Commission to consider plans for disclosure and verification "from the outset," and that point was therefore the first on the United States plan. Noting the Commission was directed to make its first report by June 1, he trusted that if "we concentrate on the items of disclosures and verification suggested we may be able to report some real progress which will enable us to grapple more intelligently with the other vital problems listed here."

The Representatives of France and the United Kingdom (M. Jules Moch and Sir Gladwyn Jebb) commented favorably on the proposed plan and accepted it in principle. The U.S.S.R. representative, in the course of questioning Mr. Cohen, repeated a number of familiar Soviet bloc charges, and maintained that disclosure and verification had been listed as Point 1 in order to prevent the Commission from coming to grips with the paramount business of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition and control of the atomic weapon.

The next meeting will be held on March 19.

## Explanation of Procedure in Case of Oliver Edmund Clubb

*Statement by Secretary Acheson*

[Released to the press March 5]

*At his press conference on March 5, Secretary Acheson made the following extemporaneous statement regarding the case of Oliver Edmund Clubb:*

Now, I should like to talk with you this morning about a matter which has been much agitated in the press recently, and that is the Clubb case. Various questions have been put to me about it. I have not answered any of those until this morning, and I shall now discuss the whole matter fully with all of you here.

First of all, I should like to remind you that the loyalty and security program of the Department was put into effect in 1947 under a Presidential order, which required such action, and it has been carried out in accordance with general rules laid down by the President and his Loyalty Review Board ever since.

The purpose of this whole program is to accomplish several things: First of all, it is to protect the Government against employing any persons whose loyalty may be doubtful, or whose security may be doubtful, so that the Government may be assured that its employees are loyal and devoted to its interests. A second great purpose of the program is to be completely fair and just to all employees of the Department, and, particularly, to an employee who may be under investigation. It is only in that way that the Government can be assured not only of the negative fact that it does not have disloyal employees, but of the positive fact that it has enthusiastic, trusted, and competent employees.

This program has resulted in the investigation of all people employed in the Department at the time the program went into effect, and with all those who have come into the Department since.

When these investigations, or information brought to the attention of the Department, require more formal proceedings, we go into a different stage of the program.

There is a Loyalty and Security Board in the Department of State. Information which comes to us, either through our own investigation or other investigations, is laid before that Board. If the Board believes that this requires a hear-

ing—response from the person involved—a notice is sent to him setting forth the information to which he is required to respond.

The Board then holds hearings. The Board then comes to conclusions. Those conclusions are reported to the Assistant Secretary in charge of these matters. If he approves of them, they are then transmitted by him to the individual concerned. If the individual concerned is dissatisfied with the finding, that individual has the right, under the regulations, to appeal to me. I can, if I choose, hear that appeal and read that record myself, or I can have that procedure followed under my direction by some officer who is deputized by me to represent me.

I should like to stress that all steps which are taken under this program are taken under my responsibility. The Secretary of State must remain responsible for the conduct of this whole procedure.

At this point I should like to bring in something somewhat more complicated. There are two general types of matters which come up in these investigations: One has to do with loyalty—if there is a reasonable doubt of the loyalty of the individual he may be separated from the service. The other question which comes up is whether the person involved is a security risk. Both of these matters are defined with certain criteria in the regulations which are available to you.

The reason I mention this is because if the finding is that a person is, or is not, disloyal, or there is reasonable doubt as to his loyalty, that matter may be reviewed by the President's Loyalty Review Board. However, in security questions, that is, if the man is found to be a security risk or not a security risk, that determination is final with me. It is not subject to review by the President's Board.

It has been our practice in the past not to discuss the procedural steps in any case, not to say what the result of each of these steps was. I am going to depart from that practice this morning because somewhat of a mystery has been made of this case. I regret that I have to do that, and I



think that, on the whole, it is not in the best interests of the program. The reason I think that is that the purpose of this whole program, and of all these investigations, is for me ultimately to determine whether or not an employee should be separated from the service for one or the other of these two reasons.

It is important that at the conclusion of this whole procedure an employee is either clearly separated or clearly reinstated; that is, cleared of the action of the charge made against him or that he is separated. There should not be twilight zones. There is a twilight zone if you report that in a particular case a certain group of my associates came to one conclusion under the procedure that was reviewed, and another person or group of my associates came to another conclusion, and that, finally, I, who have the ultimate responsibility, came to either one or the other of those conclusions, or, possibly, a third one. That does not leave the employee either completely cleared or clearly separated. In other words, we do not want to run box scores by innings on these investigations. However, in this case I think the interests of both the individual concerned, and the Government, and the public will be served by my going into the various steps in Mr. Clubb's case.

The hearing before the Loyalty and Security Board of the Department of State in Mr. Clubb's case involved two questions: One was—Was there reasonable doubt of his loyalty to the United States? The other was: Was he a security risk?

On the first question the Board found that there was not any doubt about his loyalty to the United States. That was reviewed and confirmed, so that that whole question of Mr. Clubb's loyalty was resolved in his favor throughout the procedure.

We now come to the question of security—security risk. On that matter the Board found that Mr. Clubb was, in their judgment, a security risk. That finding was sent to the Assistant Secretary who reviewed it, and approved it for forwarding to Mr. Clubb, and it was forwarded to him with the statement that under the procedure he had a period of time within which to appeal to the Secretary of State if he chose to do so. Mr. Clubb chose to appeal and within the appropriate time he appealed to me.

I have never, as I said before, been able to read these records and hear the arguments myself. I, therefore, designated one of our most experienced and trusted Foreign Service Officers to act for me, which he did. He very faithfully, very patiently, and very thoroughly reviewed the entire record. He listened to the arguments of Mr. Clubb's counsel, and he reached a conclusion, and wrote an opinion on it. That conclusion and opinion was that Mr. Clubb was not a security risk. That opinion was sent to me. I read it very carefully. I did not study the record because, as I have said, I do not have time to do that. It seemed to me that this trusted officer, who was my deputy, had

reached the right conclusion—I adopted his conclusion; I am responsible for the ultimate judgment which was that Mr. Clubb was not a security risk.

That decision was communicated to Mr. Clubb. Mr. Clubb applied for retirement. That application was considered in the Department and granted. There have been suggestions made, which I dislike very much to refer to but must, that there was some connection between my conclusion and his retirement. That is utterly and absolutely untrue. The final decision that he was not a security risk was reached on the basis of the record by my deputy, approved by me, and had nothing whatever to do with Mr. Clubb's retirement. His decision to retire was made when he had the decision of the Secretary of State before him.

That is the statement which I wish to make to you this morning, and I wish to end, as I began, by saying that I am doing this to remove any element of obscurity or mystery from this matter, in the interests of the Government, in the interest of Mr. Clubb, and in the interest of public information. But I shall not make this a practice, and in the future I hope I will not again be called upon to go into the various steps, and I hope you will understand that always the responsibility for these decisions must rest on me. It is mine under the law; it is mine under any proper administration; I must shoulder it. If there is any criticism for any result, that criticism must be directed at me and not at the various people who take part in the procedure, because each of them acts as my agent for me, as part of a procedure which is meant to give the greatest protection to the Government and the greatest protection to the individual.

*Question:* Mr. Secretary, would you name the Foreign Service Officer who acted as your deputy?

*Answer:* No, I don't think I will do that, Mr. Hightower, and the reason that I will not do it is that it makes it infinitely more difficult for me to get people to take on these highly disagreeable tasks of reviewing decisions made by people in the Department. If they are to be made the center of public controversy, they hesitate to do it. I think that if I am going to get the best advice and help that I can, in fairness to the people who work for me I must take the attitude that they are working under my direction, which is the case; that I am responsible, and that, therefore, I do not deflect any criticism which may arise from me to somebody who has been good enough and patriotic enough to come in and help me with a very disagreeable task.

*Question:* Mr. Secretary, could you define, in some way that we could understand, the difference between a loyalty and a security issue as you use the terms in this case?

*Answer:* I will try to have that done for you. Each one of these involves seven or eight para-

graphs in the regulations, and I am sure if I attempt to do it now I will get it wrong and further confuse the matter.

*Question:* Mr. Secretary, what did Mr. Clubb refer to—I can't use his exact words, but in his resignation, you know, he said something to the effect that he wouldn't be given assignments again which were in line with the career work he had done, and that, therefore, he was resigning?

*Answer:* I don't know. I am sorry, I just don't know.

*Question:* Well, would his assignment have been completely changed as a result of this? Would he have been denied the sort of work he had been doing?

*Answer:* I believe that he was informed of an assignment which was not the one which he was holding prior to the hearings.

*Question:* I see. Mr. Secretary, in mentioning that Mr. Clubb was found—that there was no reasonable doubt as to his loyalty—you added that that conclusion was reviewed. Did you imply by that that it was reviewed by the President's Loyalty Review Board?

*Answer:* No. No, it is reviewed in the Department by the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of these matters who acts for me at that stage of the proceedings.

*Question:* Well, Mr. Secretary, will you tell a Senate Committee, if they press you, who the Foreign Service Officer was that reviewed the case?

*Answer:* Oh, I don't want to speculate about that. This is a serious matter and I think that we ought to deal with it on the substance and not on that sort of basis.

*Question:* Mr. Secretary, could you say that the reason that it was possible to reverse the decision of the Security Board had to do with the fact that the reason that the Board had some doubt as to security did not actually deal with the basic charges that were lodged against Mr. Clubb to begin with?

*Answer:* I cannot. Under the President's Orders I cannot talk about the substance of any proceeding of this nature whatever. Those instructions are absolute on me.

*Question:* Mr. Secretary, have you received a request from Senator Ferguson for information on the number of persons receiving pensions after security investigations?

*Answer:* I have not received it. I am told that he is making such a request of me but I have not received it.

*Question:* Well, Mr. Secretary, are you prepared to say how many people there are in that category?

*Answer:* No, I am not informed on that subject.

*Question:* Mr. Secretary, would you care to say anything more specific about people who talk publicly about the step-by-step procedures in these loyalty and security investigations?

*Answer:* Am I prepared to do what? I am sorry I did not understand you.

*Question:* Comment on the action of people who talk publicly about the various steps involved in these loyalty and security investigations?

*Answer:* No, I don't wish to comment on anybody else. I have already said that I think it is detrimental to the proper working of this system to go into the various steps which reach the final conclusion. The final conclusion is the important thing: Is the ultimate result that the employee is cleared of the charges brought against him or is he not? That is the important thing and not who thought what at any particular stage.

*Question:* Mr. Secretary, is it the policy of the Department when a man has been investigated for loyalty, and then when perhaps there has been a disagreement among your staff as to whether he should or should not be found a security risk, then to remove him from a position where he has anything to do with secrets or policy making?

*Answer:* I know of no policy. As I say, we either clear a person or we do not clear a person.

## THE DEPARTMENT

### Educators Depart for HICOG Posts

The Department of State announced on March 8 that two American specialists have recently left the United States for Germany to participate in educational projects administered by the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany. Allan R. Lichtenberger, Director of Research, State Department of Public Instruction, Lincoln, Nebr., and the Reverend Max E. Murphy, pastor of Saints Philip and James Catholic Church, Chaguanas, Trinidad, British West Indies, have been awarded grants for this purpose under the Department of State's exchange-of-persons program.

During his 6-month stay, Mr. Lichtenberger will work with the German Institute for Educational Research, assisting the staff in the organization of its professional program for school administrators and school finance experts. He will also advise and teach the students of the Institute.

Father Murphy will remain in Germany for 3 months in order to advise on the establishment of vocational guidance centers and homes for unemployed and refugee youth. He intends to survey the existing conditions and then to initiate on a broad scale education, recreation, and welfare services. He will work with young people of the age group of 14 to 25 in Bavaria and North-Rhine-Westphalia.

### Point Four Appointment

Paul J. Findlen as acting country director of technical cooperation for Jordan.

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